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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study was conducted by the National Association of Schools of 
Public Affalrs and Administration (NASPAA) at the request of 
USAID/Honduras under the terms of NASPAA's Technical Cooperative 
Agreement with USAID. The study examined the experiences of 
USAID/Honduras and the Government of Honduras with the contracting out 
of construction activities in three sectors. The purpose of the study 
was to document empirical evidence regarding the performance of 
contracting out as a policy measure to increase private sector 
initiatives in Honduras. 
Specifically, the question of the study was: 
To what extent have any changes in the institutional 
arrangements--the shift to a system which encourages delivery 
by the private sector of publicly financed goods and 
services--succeeded in improving th~ quality of outputs, in 
reducing the time of delivery, and in decreasing the cost to 
the public sector? 
The study made comparisons among AID-funded and other p'"ojects in which 
there have been changes in the method of service delivery. A shift fr~m 
direct administration to contracting out was analyzed for the following 
three sectors: 
Housing Shelter and Urban Upgrading Programs 
Rural Primary School Cons~ruction Programs 
Rural Road Construction Progr~~ 
The study generated several important findings about the nature of 
contracting out which would prove useful in initiating policy reform 
toward privatizatlon in developing countries. First, there was little 
difference in the quality of outputs between direct administration and 
contracting out. This observation is contrary to the widespread belief 
that contr3cting out leads to higher quality. The comparable quality 
can be attributed to the fact that both methods relied on virtually 
identical construction techniques and material. In the case of rural 
school construction, the direct administration produced comparable 
quality due to active community participation. 
Second, the time needed to complete projects was about the same for the 
two methods. There was some evidence which indicated that the private 
contractors were sli~htly f~ster. However, private construction was 
delayed by bureaucratic regulations such as long period of awarding 
contract. 
Third, contracting out did not result in substantial reduction in cost 
of construction. Cost reduction by the private sector is usually 
brought about by competitive markets, technological or managerial 
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innovations, and lower compensation outlays for private sector 
employees. However, in the Honduran case, there are questiol~ about the 
competitiveness among contractors. It also appears that the private 
sector had little incentive to introduce technological or mdnagerial 
innovations for cost reduction. Thi~ is because contract awards were 
guided by the reference price system set by the government. In 
addition, the private sector paid a similar amount of compensation 
costs and conformed to the 13th month salary law. 
For policy makers in Honduras the study provides important observations 
about the design of policy measures intended to privatize publicly 
funded services. Most of all, it should be noted that the performance 
of contracting out depends heavily on the institutional environment of 
the nation. In Honduras the 1985 Contracting Law provided a positive 
legal background for potentially stable and reasonable relationships 
between the government and the private contractors. However, if the 
government wants to improve the performance of contracting out, it must 
continue to initiate further institutional changes. Among the import3nt 
tasks include the following: 
To realign the bureaucratic procedures required for awarding 
contract in order to shorten the contract award period. 
To alter the reference price system so that private 
contractors can have incentives to reduce costs of inputs. 
To encourage more use of manual labor and labor intensive 
techniques in contracting out. 
To restructure public sector employments in order to remove 
duplication of efforts when projects are contracted out. 
To use performance standards in place of ~pecification codes 
for construction projects for the purpose of encouraging 
technological or managerial innovations. 
To make markets more competitive. 
Whether the government should pur~ue privatization effort or not must 
be determined in the light of the overall national policy objectives. 
This is because the effort to provide public services more efficiently 
by privatization creates multiple impacts on political and economic 
dimensions. The public sector may be able to reduce the cost of 
producing services and decrease the time of construction by contracting 
out. But, these results will b~ accompanied by a lower level of 
community participation in certain projects and resistance a~ong public 
employees who want to keep their jobs. Therefore, if the government"s 
key objective is to encourage community participation and to maintain 
political stability, a sudden transition to priv~tizatioll is not 
necessarily desirable. On the other hand, if the gov~rnment is 
intere5ted in creating new jobs in t"e construction industry, 
contracttng out is a viacle alternative to pursue. 
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In sum, this study reveals that the policy decisions about contracting 
out in particular and privatization in general must be made in 
consideration of broad policy objectives at the national level. At 
present the knowledge bdsis to help policy makers deal with this issue 
is severely limited. We propose at least three areas for further work. 
First, there is a need to conduct similar studies in other sectors and 
other countries. These additional studies will be able to provide 
clearer evidence about the factors affecting the effectiverless of 
privatization efforts. Second, it seems crucial to investigate how 
different national policy objectives are served by privatization of 
publ:c service deliv~ry. It would be particularly important to examine 
the re~'ities of the political objectives which are often hidden in a 
typical economic analysis of public policy. Third, for practical 
purpos2, it would be useful to prepare an implementation manual for 
privatization which can be readily used by officials of developing 
countries. Such a manual will greatly improve the proces~ of actual 
policy dialogue and serve as an efficient means to facilitate policy 
reform. 
CHAPTER 1 
FRAMEWORK, OBJECTIVES, "AND METHOD OF ANALVSIS 
A. Conceptual Framework 
Over the past few years, there has been increasing attention paid to 
alternative mechanisms for relieving the fi~cal burdens of th~ public 
sector and for promoting efficiency, innovation, and incentives throu~h 
activity within the private sector. while much of the emphasis has 
focused on government-owned enterprises, there are a variety of 
alternatives to this approach. The continuum of private to public 
alternatives in ownership, decision-making authority, and the 
production and delivery of goods and services is wide indeed. These 
alternatives range from complete divestiture to partial divestiture to 
variations in the public/private relationship in the delivery of 
servic2s. Within the context of alternative service delivery options 
one can include the fo!lo~inQ possible mechanisms: contracti~J-out of 
service delivery, franchising, subsidizing private sector execution of 
a service, voluntarism, self-help, alterations in tax and regulatory 
policies or other inducements to private sector action, reducing 
~ervice demand, the use of temporary help from private firms, and the 
application of user fees and charges to adjust demand (2.H- Hatry, 
1983: 3). 
This study focuses on one subset of these choices: contracting out for 
the constructior. of infrastructure. As USAID Administrator Peter 
McPherson noted, contracting out principally is the transfer of 
decision-making authority: 
••• in which the responsibility to provide certain public services 
(and, in some cases, ownership of the assets) is retained by the 
host government, but the implementation of certain functions 
(typically operation and maintenance of f~cilities and equipment) 
is delivered by private entities through such mechanisms as 
service contracting, franchise agreements, or lease, or reliance 
upon such instruments as a voucher system or regulatory and tax 
incentives (1.A- U5AID, June, 1986: 3). 
Traditionally, the argument for the decision as to whether the public 
or private sector is more appropriate for the provision of services and 
production of goods has rested on the assumption of potential "market 
failures" as well as the nature of "p~blic guods." Generally, the 
assumption is made that where private markets function effectively, 
both consumer preferenc~ and production effic~ency are well served. 
Potential oroblems in t'"tJ mar'ket would include: 
1> the existence of "natural monopolies;" 
2) incl·eased production is associated wi th "decreased costs;" 
3) where there ~re externalities which are not reflected in thp 
~rivate cost; 
4) where it is diffi~uit to charge for a good/service, or to 
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exclude those who do not pay; 
5) where some form of merit good, as determined by society, 
exists. 
However, in recent years the increasing burden of reliance on the 
public sector and the increasing recognition that goverqment failure 
may be as pervasi ve and onerous as market fai lure, ha'ie led to a 
rethinking of the nature of a "public good" and the:>. 'propriateness of 
public sector delivery/production of even these good~.. Again, as AID 
Administrator McPherson has noted: 
The conventional approach to providing many services is for 
gover~ment to collect the revenue needed to support the service 
and to deliver the service as well. The implicit premise in this 
view is that local public services are all "public goods" ••• Yet, 
most local public services have few attributes of pure public 
goods. Most of them ... have specific identifiable users, who are 
the service's principal ueneficiaries ... Even for services that are 
closer to being pure public goods, it is not at all clear that 
government must be the deliverer of the service (1.A- AID, 1986: 
4) • 
Among the advantages generally associated with the contracting out of 
services, the following have been identified: lowers costs or improves 
performance for the same service, provides for specialized skills, 
promotp.s the transfer of those skills to the private sector, limits the 
expansion of government, avoids initial large-scale costs, permits 
greater flexibility in adjusting program size and term, may provide a 
yardstick for cost and efficiency comparisons, and may produce (and 
transfer to the private sector) better managerial skills. Among 
potential disadvantages, the following have been identified: the 
reduction of costs issue is not clear; it may result in poorer or 
discriminatory service to citizen/consumers; it may increase the 
potential for corruption; contractors may default on completion of 
contracts; it may displace public employees; it may prove to be 
difficult to design needed contract ~tatements; depending on the 
context there may be administrative and allocative inefficiencies 
because of legal and institutional problems; enforcing public policy 
and monitoring contract performance may be affected; it may not provide 
adequate competition (2.H-Hatry, 1984:15). 
B. Objectives 
This st~dy attempts to examine some of these potential advantag~s and 
disadvantages within the context of Honduras. Contracting out should 
not be thought of as a panacea for accomplishing privatization of 
services. It is not necessarily the case that "the more the private 
sector does, the better." Policy makers are often caught in the 
dilemma of strategic choices among mul~iple goals. Each approach must 
be considered within the cont~xt of the goals of th~ program in order 
to evaluate when and under what cnnditions which appru~ch is more 
appropriate. Competition, employment generation, conLumer access, 
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distributional equity, reduction of public sector burdens, expanding 
private sector capabilities <technical and managerial) are all 
worthwhile goals; however, these and others may not be pursuable within 
the cont~xt of a single answer as to whether one approach or the other 
is "better." Better for what is a mrire appropriate question. Also, it 
is not a casE' of "either/or"; a num'oer of intermediate positions where 
both direct administration (public sector provision) and contracting 
out <private sector provision) can ~e utilized in tandem. 
The main objectives of this study ar~ to assess the problems, 
advantages, and disadvantages associatp.d with contracting cut and 
direct administration. By assessing the experiences of USAID/Honduras 
in the three areas of shelter housing and urban upgrading, primary 
school construction, and rural r~ad construction, there may be some 
important insights and caveats as to the apprupriateness of approaches 
and potential changes in the current administration of these 
approaches. 
C. Method of Analysis 
The central question of this study on the "contracting out" in Honduras 
is the following: 
To what extent have any changes in the institutional 
arrangements--the shift to a system which encourages 
delivery by the private sector of publically-financed 
goods and services-- succeeded in stimulating private 
sector activity, in improving quality and speed of 
delivery, and in reducing costs of the public sector? 
The study attempted to compare systematically the delivery of goods and 
services of different institutional arrangements. In general, there are 
a number of key questions relevant to the evaluation of contracting-out 
experiences. These include: 
o Macro-Economic factors. How do "contracting" out 
arrangements affect the macro-economy of a country? 
o Contextual Environment. How do e~onomic, political, legal 
conditions of a nation affect the private sector's capacity 
for involvement in contracting out with the public sector? 
o Efficiency of Contracting Out. How efficient is the 
contiactual arrangement in terms ~f costs of production, 
timing of production, and quality of output? 
o Effects on Public Sector Employment. To what extent have 
there been changes in public sector employment levels and 
roles as a result of contrecting out? 
o Legal and Institutional Issues. To what extent have the legal 
and institutional factors affected contracting out? 
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o Consumer Input and Choice. To what extent does contracting 
out affect consumer input into decisior.-making and choice in 
Honduras? 
o Qistribution Issues. Are there any distributional or access 
implications in ccntracting out? 
o Facility Maintenance. To what degree h~v~ there been changes 
in facility maintenance as a result of contracting out? 
o Public Sector Vs Private Sector Relationships. To what extent 
have public and private sector relationships changed as a 
result of contracting out procedures? 
For specific projects, three sets of issues need to be analyzed in 
order to assess the advantages, disadvantages, and problems associated 
with contracting-out: 1) institutional, 2) technical and engineering, 
and 3) economic issues. 
The major institutional issu~s are: 
a Legal issues of contracting out 
a Bidding procedures for contractors 
a Government-contractor relationships 
a Government responsibilities of projects/ contractor 
a Performance by contractors 
a Institutional implications of private contracting 
a External market conditiDns and impacts 
The major technical/engineering issues are: 
o Design techniqu~s 
o Construction techniques 
o Man~gement techniques 
o Government oversight 
o Environmental impacts 
o Engineering legal issues 
The major economic issues are: 
o Analysis of efficiency 
o Financial analysis 
o Distributional impacts 
v Employment and labor issues 
o External and market conditions and impacts 
In this study we deal selectively with these key issues. We focus on 
institution~l arrangements, costs, timing of construction programs in 
housing, primary schools, and roads. AID/Honduras has supported 
various programs in each of thase areas with differing levels and types 
of contracting out arrangements. Table 1-1 presents the programs 
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examined by this study. The programs are classified in terms of 
relative degrees of direct administration and contracting-out. 
Each sector was studied separately as the designs, planning, 
administration, implementation, and 'use of contracturs were 
sufficiently different. Overall generalizations and conclusions are 
made for the individual sectors within their separate chapters. In 
addition, overall conclu~ions and recommendations are made in the final 
chapter. The variables studied necessarily shifted in each sector 
studied. Thus, although there are overall general variables! they may 
be treated differently in each sector. 
Information was collected from existing documents available in Honduras 
during the period from October to December, 1986. In addition, the 
study team interviewed USAID officials, public sector officials, and 
private sector persons. Field trips were made to housing construction, 
rural school construction, and rural road sites. (See Appendix for 
bibliography of documents and people interviewed> 
The study represented a 150 ddy work effort by NASPAA. It included a 15 
work' day planning effort in Washington prior to arrival in Honduras; 
130 field work days in Honduras; and 5 work days editing in Washington. 
Sectors 
Housing 
Rural 
Pr~mary 
Sci", JO Is 
Rural 
Roads 
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TABLE 1-1 
CLA9SIF1CATION OF PROGRAMS STUDIED 
Direct Administration 
Urban Upgrading by DINA 
and CMDC (AID funded) 
Rural Classrooms by MOE 
(AID funded) 
Rural Classrooms by MOE 
(GOH funded) 
Road Rehabilitation 
(Manual labor) by SECOPT 
Road Construction 
(Manual labor) by SECOPT 
Contracting-Out 
Urban Upgrading by CMDC 
(AID funded) 
Low-i~come Hou~ing 
Construction by INVA 
(AID funded) 
Rurdl Classrooms by MOE 
(AID funded) 
Road Rehabilitation by 
SECOPT (AID funded) 
Road Construction by 
SECOPT (AID funded) 
Road Construction by 
SECOPT (lOB funded) 
Road Construction by 
SECOPT (World Bank 
funded) 
CHAPTER 2 
HOUSING AND URBAN UPGRADiNG 
A. Background 
It is estimated that the population of Honduras as of 1985 was 4.2 
million with over 700,000 housing units, of which 21X are found in the 
metropolitan areas of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, 9X in other urban 
areas, and 70X in rurai areas. (10.C- Rourk, 1986: 1-4) Over 70X of the 
urban population of the country was unable to obtain conventional 
housing finance in 1974. (11.K- AID, 1985) A survey conducted by 
USAID/Honduras in 1979 concluded that 55X of the families in marginal 
b3rrics did not have access to piped water services, 66X did not have 
sewer connections, and 25X did not have access to electricity. The 
estimated populations of these mar~inal communities totaled 31,000 
hou~ehold5 in Tegu~igalpa and 19,000 households in San Pedro Sula. 
(11.K- AID, 1985) Several general characteristics of the condition and 
tenure status of housing in Hondura5 are descr!bed in Table 11-1. 
Honduras does not have a population problem as such with only 4.2 
million people or 32 inhabitants per square kilometer. However, the 
populatiun growth rate was approximately 3.3X in 1985. The urban 
po~t.!lation growth rate is double that, or 6.2X per year. Consequemtly, 
the nation's erban population increased from 29X of the total 
population in 1970 to 39% in i985. The rate of increase of the urban 
"marginal" (poorl population has been increasing at a rate of four 
times that of the nation as a whole and twice that of the urban 
cp-nters. That is to ~ay, the urban poor of Honduras are increasing at 
the phenomenal rate of 12% per year. Should this rate remain 
unchanged, the urban poor can be expected to double in size 
approximately every six years. A significant consequence of this 
explosion of the urban po~r population has been an increasing number of 
lan~ invasions: twenty-seven in Tegucigalpa alone in 1980-1981. (11.K-
AID, 1985) 
Honduras' National Development Plan for 1982-1986 estimated that 
approximately 100,000 substandard housing units are found in the urban 
areas. (10.[- CONSUPLANE, 1980) About 90X of these units are occupied 
by low ]ncome families) these families earning less than the median 
family incDme. (11.M- AID, 1985) Prior to the emphasis made by AID's 
Housing Guaranty (HG) programs, Honduras private sector housing 
construction supplied the high income end of the market and there was 
little public sector production of low income housing or few public 
works for the low income- "marginal" population. In addition~ there was 
little housing financing available to low income families. 
B. Housinq PrograM~ 
During the 19605 and 1970s Honduran housing policy was geared 
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primarily to direct government-built and subsidized housing units. 
These activities benefitted middle-income households primarily. Recent 
policies for low-income residents have evolved through collaboration 
among AID and various Honduran institutions such as INVA and the 
National Housing Finance Agency (FINAVI). 
Once a program has been developed, AID and the Honduras government 
enter into an implementation agreement that defines the use of the loan 
funds, The borrower obtains a loan at the prevailing interest rate 
from an eligible private U.S. lender of its choice. Upon signing the 
loan agreement, AID executes a contract of guarantee for the U.S. 
lender indicating that loan repayment is guaranteed against all risks 
~y the U.S. government. At the same time, AID obtains a full-faith and 
credit guar~ntee of repayment from the host country. In 1977, the 
Government of Honduras, in its National Housing Policy, committed 
i tsel f t'::l "focus on low income persons". AID presently has three 
shelter programs in operation: Shelter for the Urban Poor (522-HG-
005); Private Sector Shelter (~22-HG-007), and Urban Upgrading (522-HG-
006). The first two provide low cost housing and home improvement 
loans ta~geted for the urban poor and the last one ,provides public 
services, such as potable water and sewage disposal systems for the 
same population. The ambitious goal of these thr~e programs was stated 
in the Private Sector Shelter and the Urban Upgrading Project papers: 
At the pea:, production level, the three AID shelter projects in 
Honduras will improve 5,000 existing housing units in marginal 
communities and will finance 4,500 new housing units per year. 
Thi!; level of production, if sustained, would satisfy the basic 
shelter needs of the urban poor residing in Tegucigalpa and San 
Pedro Sula within twenty years, that is, by the year 2002. (11.M-
AID, 1985) 
It [urban upgrading] is designed to increase assistance 
sub~itantially to the more than 60% of the population in th8 two 
major cities who live in settlements with inadequate or no basic 
urban services ••. (II.F- AID, 1981) 
A fourth project (522-HG-008), Shelter for the Urban Poor, is scheduled 
to begin in 1987. 
A summary description of the USqID/Honduras housing projects is as 
follows: (I1.A- AID~ 1986) 
Shelter for the Urb~n Poor I - On November 20, 1980 AID and the 
Government of Honduras (GOH) signed an Implementation Agreement for HG 
Loan 522-HG-005. The purpose of the project was to develop within 
(INVA) a capability t.o produce and deliver approximately 2,000 low-
cost shelter units and 1,000 home improvement loans annually to 
families below the median income level in certain urban centers of 
Honduras. The project was to finance 4,340 new housing units and 3,000 
home improvement loans. 
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The project was estimated to cost $15.8 million of which the HG loan 
was to finance $10.5 million, INVA $5 million, and an AID grant 
$300,000. The estimated completion date for the project was September 
30, 1983. 
Urban Upgrading in Marginal Communities - On June 6, 1980 AID and the 
Government of Honduras (GOH) signed an implementation agreement fo. HG 
loan 522-HG-006. The purpose of the project was to lmprove the 
capacity of the municipal governments of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula 
to implement cost-recoverable programs to upgrade marginal urban 
communities by providing infrastructure, such as water and sewer 
services, and by financing home improvement loans. The project was to 
provide basic infrastructure to about 80 marginal communities in 
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula with an estimated population of 31,000 
families. The home improvement loans were to benefit between 2,000 and 
2,500 families. 
The implementing agencies for the project were the municipalities of 
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, wi~h $7.5 million allocated to 
Tegucigalpa and $2.5 million to San Pedro Sula. 
The estimated cost of the proj~ct Has $12,850,000 of 
was to finance $10 million, AID grant.s $350,000, the 
Tegucigalpa $2 million, and San Pedro Sula $500,000. 
completion date for the project was April 30, 1984. 
Hhich the HG loan 
municipalities of 
The estimated 
Private Sector Shelter Program - On September 28, 1981 AID and the 
Government of Honduras (GOH) signed an Implementation Agreemel't for the 
Loan 522-HG-007. The purpose of the project was to establish a 
functional ~ystem for expanded private sector involvement in the 
provision of shelter affordable by the urban poor in Honduras. The 
project was to finance Phase I of the government's Emergency Housing 
Plan. It was to consist of the r.onstruction, sale and mortgage 
financing by the private sector of approximately 6,721 housing units in 
the urban areas of 7egucigalpa and S~n Pedro Sula. Projects included 
housing developments in the neighborhoods of La Mo~a II, La Planeta, 
Satelite, San Jorge, and Centroamerica Oeste. 
FINAVI was the implementing agency for the project. FINAVI was the 
regulatory agency for the savings and loan system in Honduras. AID 
assisted in the establishment of FINAVI in 1975 with a $4 million seed 
capital loan. FINAVI was to provide construction financing to the 
developers through its affiliated savings and loan associations. AID 
authorized a r~volying 0dvance for up to $7.5 million in HG funds for 
construction financing. After the housing units were sold, FI~AVI was 
to pur=hase eligible mortgages from the associations and use the 
mortgage to support the AID guaranteed disbursements under the HG loan. 
The estimated cost of mortgage financing for the project was $27 
million, of which the HG loan was to finance $25 million dnd FINAVI $2 
million. In addition, AID agreed to provide a grant of $75,000 for 
technical assistance. The e5timated completion date for the project 
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was March 31, 1983. 
C. Institutional Analysis 
1. AID Management of Housing Guarantee Projects 
All three programs are expected to be completed in 1986. Table 11-2, 
Item 3 below shows that the three programs are far behind schedule. 
Presently Urban Upgrading (005) has less than $225,000 to disburse, 
Private Sector Shelter (007) has $80,000 remaining to be spent, and 
Shelter for the Urban Poor (005) has $1,635,000 in the account with 
$543~000 approved for disbursement but which is being held in escrow 
because the GOH is in arrears in its payments to AID. The Private 
Sector Shelter Program (007) had $10 million reprogrammed from its $25 
million original budget when FINAVI was abolished by the GOH on 
November 5, 1985. The co~pletion of all three projects is a condition 
for the new housing loan, Shelter for the Urban Poor II (008, 3S 
amended by the Implementation Agreement). The $10 million reprogrammed 
from the Private Sector Shelter program (007) will be augmented by $15 
million for a total of $25 million plus a $7.5 million GOH 
contribution. This new housing loan has not y~t been implemented. It 
is anticipated that the new $42.5 million Shelter for the Urban Peor II 
(008) will begin in 1987 - after the completion of the three existing 
programs. 
2. Urban Upgrading Project 
Of the three programs presently in operation, Urban Upgrading 
(006) is the most simple in design, has had the lea~t problems, and is 
generally considered successful. The manner in which this program is 
implemented is designed to include community involvement, private 
sector participation, and cost recovery. 
The Urban Upgrading Project began with the identification of project 
areas. Social promoters in thp two cities, Tegucigalpa (CMDC) and San 
Pedro Sula (MSPS), identify those low income neighborhoods th~t are 
interested in installing potable water, sewer, or pavement in their 
communities. Once the priorities are set and a commitment is made to 
proceed, the eligibility of the project is determined based on 
technical and social criteria. Social criteria include income, 
environmental soundness, conformity to the city's urban plan, and a 
resolution of any land tenure problems. Technical criteria include 
engineering and economic feasibility and efficiency. 
The Municipality of Tegucigalpa contracts-out the construction phase 
of the project to private firms. The Municipality in San Pedro Sula 
has used both contracting out and direct administration, although the 
recent experiences of the city have been with direct administration 
only. The municipality's Implementation Unit then requests bids from a 
list of pre-qualified private construction firms. The bids are 
analyzed by an independent committee which receives no compensation for 
its work. The committee judges the bids and awards the contract, on the 
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basis of technical reports prepared independently by the engineering 
office of the municipality and a private contractor, to the lowest 
bidder. The legal departm~nt of the municipality then prepares the 
contracts. Separate contracts are awarded for the construction and the 
supervision of the work. The engineering department of the 
Implementation Unit monitors the contracts and performs periodic 
inspections. This latter function is supported by technical assistance 
provided by an AID/RHUDO engineer. 
Once the work has been completed and the final costs are known, the 
Cadastre Department provides the basic data (land areas, current 
property values, etc.) to the Betterment Tax Unit which then reassesses 
the properties benefitting from the project in accordance with agreed 
upon formulas. The Betterment Tax Unit then distributes the final 
costs to the property owners in accordance with the benefits received 
as evidenced by the reassessment. The final cost per property owner is 
then sent to water utility for billing in conjunction with the regular 
water bill. Terms are 12 years to pay at an annual interest rate of 
17%. The beneficiaries pay the bills to the Aut~nomous Municipal Bank 
(BANMA) in the case of Tegucigalpa or to the Water and Sewer Authority 
(DIMA) in San Pedro Sula. AID reimburses the municipalities for about 
75% of the total cost of these projects. 
3. Housing Programs 
(a) Housing Construction 
The other two programs, Shelter for the Urban Poor (005) and Private 
Sector Shelter (007) are housing loans designed to build low cost 
housing in urban areas for sale to the poor (less than median income). 
Shelter for the Urban Poor (005) has been the mor~ successful of the 
two, but has experienced many serious setbacks which have rendered tha 
program less than a total su,cess. 
The housing programs are implemen~ed by INVA. Initially~ INVA selected 
the site for a low-cost housing project, determined the type ~nd number 
of units to be ~uilt, designed the project, prepared the technical 
reports, and called for bids from a list of previously pre-qualified 
private con~truction firms. Once the low cost bid was accept~d, 
construction of the project was undertaken with financial advances from 
AID and interim financing provicied by INVA. Upon completion, INVA 
assumed the task of financing a~d selling the units. The H~to de 
Enmedio and the La Paz prOjFcts w~re financed in this way. This 
procedure proved unsatisfactory since the private construction firm 
incurred no risk whatsoever, nor did they put up any front money, such 
as bid bonds or performance suretie~. Profits were obtained without 
monetary investment or risk. 
Beginning with the EI Sitio project in Tegucigalpa, the implementation 
of the nelivery system was modified to remedy this situation. INVA, 
with AID assistance, institu~ed a "turnkey sy~tem". Initially, INVA 
designs the program under this system, identifies localities for 
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prospective projects, and determines the type and number of housing 
units to be built. It then advertises that it will accept proposals 
from private firms to develop and build a project along the lines 
Jpecified. INVA evaluates the proposals and selects the lowest cost 
proposal for implementation. A contract between INVA and the 
developer/builder is negotiated, which stipulates the terms and 
conditions under which the project is developed and built. The private 
developer/builder selects the site of the project, obtains the land, 
designs the project, obtains his own construction financing, and builds 
the project. INVA monitors alld inspects the work throughout the term 
of the project. When the project is completed, INVA receives the 
housing units, sells them, and provides mortgage financing. Twenty 
year mortgages are given to eligible low-income families at a 12X 
annual interest rate. As of September 30, 1986, the Shelter for the 
Urban Poor has provided these outputs: 801 serviced lots, 1,623 basic 
houses, and 550 one bedroom units. 
(b) Home Improvement Loans 
In addition to providing low-cost housing, the program also 
provides home improvemE1t loans to those low-income families who have 
purchased a lot or housing unit from INVA. These loans have been 
available in three forms: cash loan; material loans from INVA 
warehouses; material loans at fixed prices from private suppliers. The 
loans are made for 5 years at 15X interest. As of September 30, 1986, 
INVA has made 1,496 home improvement loans under this program. 
(c) Private Sector Shelter Program 
The least successful of all three housing programs has been the 
Private Sector Shelter Program (007). This program was initially 
administered by FINAVI. The program was initiated by the Government of 
Honduras providing interest-free financing of $5 million to private 
construction companies in order to produce low income housing in 
Tegucigalpa and San PedrQ Sul~ b~ginning March 1981. The financing 
passed through FINAVI and then through two savings and loan 
associations - La Con~tancia and La Vivienda de Sula. The GOH 
requested AID assistance after construction was already in progress in 
San Pedro Sula and the project sites and plans were completed elsewhere 
in the country. AID assistance began in December 31, 1981 when the 
loan agreement was signed. RHUDO/CA required that the private 
contractors provide some of their own construction financing. 
The principal institutions and their responsibilies are: 
FINAVI Project coordinatir.n, supervision and 
policy. 
- obtaining both short- and long-term 
financing for the Project. 
- liaison for the Project. 
- monitoring of HG loan repayment. 
- regulatory agency and refinancing 
S&L Associations 
Developers 
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facility for 5&Ls 
- mortgage lending to project 
'1eneficiaries. 
- work-in~progress inspections. 
- construction lending management on 
behalf of FINAVI. 
- supervision of sales program. 
- construction of units. 
- sal~s of units, under contract tu 
5&L associations. 
- obtaining approval by municipal and 
public utilities of units and 
infrastruc';ure network!>. (11.M-MD, 1985) 
Mortgages to the purchasers of these low-cost housing units were 
provided by the S&L associations for 20 years at 19.5% annual intere~t 
charges. As of 9/30/86, 3,308 houses were sold whereas more than 5,500 
were constructed. (ll.N- AID, 1~86) Consequently, the amount of money 
authorized for this program was reduced to $15 million from the 
original $25 million with the approval of the amendment to the New 
Shelter for the Urban Poor II loan (008). FINAVI has been terminated 
by the GOH due to poor performance and financial problems resulting 
from the government's involvement in the poorly planned emergency 
shelter housing program launched in 1980. Liquidation is being 
administered by the Fiduciary Housing Fund (FOVI) of the C~ntral Bank. 
D. Economic Analysis 
1. Overall Performance of Housing Programs 
This section provides economic indicators of the performance of three 
programs. More specifically, we will attempt to provide measurements 
of changes in quantity, quality, and spEed of delivery of the various 
contracting-out experiences. Indicators of efficiency- least cost, 
clearing the market, and goal achievement- will also be con5idered. 
Competition as well as changes in public and private sector activity 
will be evaluated utilizing the data and information available for such 
purposes. It must be borne in mind throughout that none of these 
programs u~ed direct administration (public) construction. All three 
programs contracted-out their con~truction to privat~ firms. To 
expedite the analysis, the salient variables and indicators are 
present.ed in summarized form in Table 11-2. 
(a) Private Sector Shelter Program (007) 
Table 11-2, Item 3 indicates that all three prGgrams required more time 
to complete than planned. The Private Sector Shelter PrograM (007) 
required l'I~ore than two and a half times as long to complete than 
anticipatej. The Shelter for Urban Poor (005) required twic~ ~s much 
time to completp. as programmed and Urban Upgrading needed 63% more time 
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than planned to complete. None of the three were, therefore, delivered 
un schedule. Moreover, the Private Sector Shelter ~rogram was reduced 
by nearly 40Y. and required more time for completion than the other two 
programs. 
How is this inability to deliver on schedule eKplained? Looking first 
at the Private Sector Shelter Program (007) we see that the program was 
successful in constructing the units at a rate eKceeding that of the 
other two program (item 4, table 11-2). Whereas this program hac 
produced 82Y. of its programmed housing units as of September 1985, it 
was unable to sell them as fast as the other two programs (item 5, 
Table 11-2). Among other things, the sale prices for units in 1985 
were higher than anticipated in 1981 (item 7, Table 11-2). Its 
mortgage interest rate was also higher than thut of the other two 
programs (item 6, Table 11-2), and consequently it was obliged to sell 
25Y. of the housing units constructed to families which did not qualify 
-- families with incomes higher than the regional median (item 8, Table 
11-2). Cost recovery, consequently, was not achieved and mortgage loan 
delinquencies were an astrorlomical 57Y. as of September, 1985 (item 7, 
Table 11-2). As late as September, 30, 1986, only 3,308 units of more 
than 5,500 were sold. (11.J- AI~, 1984) 
(b) Shelter for the Urban Poor (005) 
This program also required more time for completion than planned, more 
than twice as long (item 1, Table 11-2). In this case, however, t~ere 
were problems with constr·uction with some housing such as case units 
eKceeding production targets while others such as serviced lots fallina 
way behind schedule (item 4, Table 11-21. More of the constructed 
housing units were sold in this program than in Private Sector Shelter, 
63Y. vs. 43Y. (item 5, Table 11-2). A greater percentage of the planned 
families to be assisted were provided with low-cost housing and this is 
partly eKplained by the lower mortgage terms, 20 years at 12% intere5t 
of this program ys. the 20 years at 19.5Y. interest of the Private 
Sector Shelter Program (item 6, Table 11-2). Becaus~ the cost of these 
housing units increased over the years due to an inability to meet 
targ~ted goals in a timely manner (item 9, Table 11-2) and because only 
7Y. of purchasers are above the median income (i~em 8, Table 11-2), the 
mortgage and home delinquency rates exceeded that of the Private Sector 
Shelter Program (item 7, T~ble 11-2). DelinqUEncy rates of 71Y. for 
mortgag~s and 81Y. for home improvement loans (item 7, Table 11-2), 
imply that cost recovery will probably be unattainable in this program. 
In both the Private Sector Shelter Housing Program and in Shelter for 
the Urban Poor, the following shortcomings of the contracting-out 
eKperience have been noted: 
a. Difficulties and time lost in improving the institutional 
performance of INVA. 
b. Difficulties in implementing t~e new "turnkey system" -
specially in the El Sitio project. 
c. Financing at rates of interest significantly below INVA's 
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cost of raIsIng the money to lend. 
d. Excessive delegation of responsibili~y to private contractors-
especially in site selp.ction and project design. 
e. Failure to r~cogniz~ and deal with monopolistic dimensions 
operating in the private sector. 
f. Contracting-out of construction with inadequate prov151~n 
made for sales, mortga~e financing~ and collection. 
g. Impro~er design and monitoring to ensure that the targeted 
low-income population benefitted. (10.C- Rourk, 1986) 
Among other things, this comparative analysis demonstrates that similar 
institutional delivery systems fail (01' succeed) for similar reasons. 
(c) Urban Upgrad i ng (006) 
{his program is considered a succe~s by most evaluators of these three 
urban housing/service programs. With respect to speed of delivery, 
this program performed well requiring only 50~ more time to complete 
than the two housing program designed to improve the living conditions 
of the urban poor (item 3, Table 11-2). As one AID study notes, on-
5ite construction was completed far ahead of either off-site 
construction or municipal de~artmental actions to valorize properties, 
distribut~ costs, or edu~ate beneficiaries on the need to repay 
investments. The speedy construction on-site is attributed directly to 
the use of contracting-out in Tegucigalpa: 
In part the ability of the municipalities to complete on-site 
construct ion on a sc:ale far outpacing the other' components was due 
to the municipalities contracting out both the construction and 
supervision of the work. This mode of operation permitted the 
municipalities to complete a larger number of sub-prOjects in a 
relatively short period of time, thus enhancing the positive 
impacts of the program in delivering basic infrastructure to the 
low-income neighborhoods. (11.K- AID, 1985: 22) 
However, coordination between contractors and municipal departments or 
entities or among municipal entities remained a problem. 
Sales of these services, potaule water, sewage disposal, and pavement, 
are not a problem because of the way the program is designed. 
Commitments to buy are made by the community of beneficiaries before 
construction begins, as explained abov~. However, promises to pay and 
actual payment are not one and the same. Only 30% of the families 
scheduled to be benefitted by this program were so served as of 
September, 1985 (item 4, Table 11-2). This is the lowest rate of 
delivery of ali three pru:rams. Again the high interest rate of 17% 
partially explains this performance (item 6, Table 11-2). There is no 
data on the portion of ineligible beneficiaries in this program and ~e 
may presume that only low-income families have been served. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that 67X of the low-income families 
who have benefitted from this program who agreed to pay for the 
services defaulted as of September 1985 (item 7, Table 11-2). 
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Included among the reasons cited for its less-than-anticipated ~esults 
are the following: 
a. Difficulties and time lost in improving the institutional 
performBnce of CMDC and MSPS. 
b. The fact that "San Pedro Sula has never fully accepted the idea 
of contracting out of the construction work" and prefers to 
utilize direct construction. 
c. Failure to coordinate rapid construction of projects by private 
cuntractois with public support services from cadastre 
departments and SANAA hook-ups. 
d. No provision made for the funding of "off-site" connections 
needed to make projects operational. 
e. Cost of services and finance charges in e~cess of ability of 
low-income beneficiaries to pay. (11.K- AID, 1985) 
2. Cost Comparison of Upgrading Projects 
Our prelimi~ary attempts at obtaining comparative information on low 
income housing and what we have learned is presented in this section of 
the report. We deal with Urban Upgrading (006'. Since this assistance 
is intended to be continued under the new Shelter for the Urban Poor II 
project (as amended), it would be a logical choice for comparative 
investigation. As we ilave noted elsewhere in this chapter, comparison 
of different administrative systems in terms of costs is made more 
difficult because of differences in data colle~tion techniques. In 
direct administration or force accounts such items as overhead, certain 
personnel costs, depreciation, and other items are not accoynted for, 
or, if they are, unrealistically so. Even in contr~cted pl'ojects, 
similarity of duta is a problem. Unfortunately, data are not 
collected and recorded in way that facilitates this analysis in 
Honduras in Urban Upgrading. Our preliminary attempts at data 
collection for cost comparisons revealed a number of obstacles which 
will make the task a difficult one. To begin with, engineers and non-
economists do cost estimation and data collection. As seen in Table 
11-3 below, engineers use unit costs of construction. Material, labor, 
depreciation, ta~es, and profits are obscured in the process. In 
addition, CMDC does not use the same format for project cost 
accounting as SANAA. While engineering records are in good order, the 
ac~ouncing departments are less well organized. Consequently, many 
actual costs are obscured or not recorded and cost comparisons as well 
as analyses are e~tremely difficult under these conditions. 
In this study, we have attempted to compare a select sample of six CMDC 
projects, three direct administration (public construction) and three 
contracting-out of construction to private firms. For only two 
projects were we able to obtain cost dat~ for comparison. In addition, 
no attempt was made to ~ompare these two projects with one of direct 
administration from SANAA. Comparisons between SANAA projects and AID-
CMDC projects would be most productive and are recommended for future 
investigations. 
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The two projects selected for cost comparisons were "Oscar A. Flores" 
(contracting-out> and "San Jose" (direct administration> in 
Tegucigalpa. The Oscar A. Flores project was for potable water and 
sew~r3ge whila San Jose was only d sewerage project. Cost figures were 
adju~ted accordingly so that only those costs incurred in sewage 
SystE~'S construction were compared; 
The direct administration San Jose project was undertaken one year 
later than the Flores project and the 'osts or the earlier project 
should be increased by about 5X to account for inflation. This, 
however, was not done since it did not significantly alter our 
preliminary test. CMDC engineers stated that the two projects were 
similar in all other respects. 
Table 11-3 below lists the unit cost comparisons of the two project,s. 
Most notable is the wide variation of costs such ~hat virtually no two 
are identical. Determinations of concrete costs are not estimated in 
the same way. In many cases, such as excavation, installation, and 
fill-in, direct administration San Jose costs were nearly twice that of 
the contracted-out project. Even a simple comparison of costs like 
this one, therefore, is useful. Why do such big differences in cost 
occur in similar projects using similar technology, ~aterial, and 
equipment? It would appear that ther~ are significant CO$~S associated 
with direct admini~tration that do not occur in contracting out. 
In addition to unit costs calculated by engineers, CMDC also records 
glot-al costs on its urban upgrading pr"ojects. These costs are little 
more than unit construction costs rearranged and augmented with 
miscellaneous other expenses - most of which are estimated. As seen in 
Table 11-4, construction costs of a project calculated in this way vary 
from project to project instead of being a constant portion as might be 
expected. The contracting-out project Oscar A. Flores construction 
costs were only c~lculated at 65X of total project costs whereas the 
directly administered San Jose project construc~ion costs were 
estimated to be BOX of total project costs. CMDC pays approximately 
741. of total project costs whereas private constru~tion costs in the 
Oscar Flores project were less than this amount. 
The San Jose project listed no supervision costs and its fees to the 
city for connecting to the main sewerage network were only 6X of total 
cost while the Oscar Flores project paid lOX of a much larger total 
cost for these services. Thus, the questions arise, was there no 
supervision of direct administration projects or were these costs 
simply not recorded? Does the city charge privat~ contractors more 
than the CMDC to tap into its infrastructure? 
In addition to focusing investigation on working hypotheses, 
compar~tive studies of cost can provide measurements of the degree of 
privatization that has occurred. In urb~n upgrading, contracting-out 
to private enterprises represents about 65X of projects and the 
remainder is public, at least in this one comparison. 
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Another finding of this comparison is that the contracting-out project 
provided sewerage facilities to the urban poor at a lower cost per 
family and per meter of system. Contracting-out Oscar A. Flores 
provided this service for Ll,195 per family and L150 per meter while 
the directly administe~ed San Jose pr~ject provlded a similar service 
for Ll,386 per family and L181 per meter of system. If 45 percent of 
the projects, even with contracting-out, are still public, major cost 
reductions may not realistically be expected in many cases. For 
example, more efficient private production may reduce construction 
costs by lOX which may be offset by increased supervision costs and 
public fees in excess of these savings. Likewise, the law requires 
only that the lowest bidder gets the contract whether the bids are true 
least cost or not. 
3. Municipality of San Pedro Sula (MSPS) 
In San Pedro Sula urban upgrading is handled by the Municipal 
Directorate of Water IDIMA) of the MSPS. It functions very 
independently from the MSPS. Its almost exclusive mode of operation is 
direct administration to upgrade about 75 marginal neighborhoods in and 
around San Pedro Sula. Of these 75 neighborhoods only five received 
direct funding assistance from AID; another new five neighborhoods are 
re~eiving assistance through the Employment Generation Program. DIMA 
has cancelled its other relationship with AID because the Housing 
Guaranty Loan Program required a 17% interest on the loan which is much 
higher than DIMA wanted to pay. 
DIMA used contracting out earlier, but has used exclusively direct 
administration since 1984. The reason for the reliance on direct 
atministration is a belief by DIMA executive officers that direct 
ad~inistration is cheaper, faster, and more efficient. Also, DIMA 
bel5~ves that contractors charge excessive administrative costs and 
charge profit on direct costs in excessive amounts. Although DIMA was 
unable to provide specific data to substantiate this position, it is 
instructive to explore the rationale. 
The following seven items are typical of a contract. The items are 
listed as a percentage of both contractor (direct) cost ~s well as a 
percentage of those costs for DIMA on the same item. 
CONTRACTOR 
1. Preliminary expenses 5X 2X 
2. Materials 55 50 
3. Manual labor 20 15 
4. Miscellaneous 5 5 
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5. Equipment 15 10 
Total Direct Costs 100 82 
6. Administration 25 
7. Profit 25 
Total Direct and Indirect Cost 150 82 
EKplanation 
1. Preliminary expenses. DIMA has few preliminary costs but 
contractors must solicit bids, make proposals. All this is charged to 
the project. 
2.Materials. DIMA orders in lots and can negotiate better prices than 
contr~ctors. 
3. Manual Labor. DIMA is able to get manual labor faster, cheaper, and 
from ~he community. 
4. Miscellaneous. No differences. 
5. Equipment. DIMA can negotiate rental equipment at lower costs than 
contractor because th~ latter uses hIS own equipment. Contractor has to 
charge more because of depreciation. 
6. Administration. Contractor charges 25 % on all direct costs. Here, 
DIMA fails to takp. into account their administration costs 
which are likely to be similar. 
. 
7. Profit. Contractors charge profits but DIMA does not. 
A rough calculus based upon these partial data gained from discussions, 
and r.al<ing into account the 25 % DIMA administration costs not 
included, suggests that the contractor costs are substantially greater. 
However, one must be careful with interpreting these ineKact numbers. 
TMe most striking feature of DIMA is that it is convinced of the 
soundness of this approach, is content wi~h the approach, and will most 
likely use this approach in the future. 
E. Workable Competition in the Private Sector 
In this section of the r~port we will add~e5s the question of private 
sector competition and its impact upon the three Mission programs in 
low-income housing and public services. To begin with, workable 
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competition is like contracting out, a middle position along a spectrum 
from pure competition to pure monopoly: 
Pure Competition------Workable Competition------Pure Monopoly 
Private------------------Contracting Out------------Public 
Sector Sector 
We would e~pect to find that, everythi~~ else equal, the greater the 
private sector competition, the better thp performance of the 
contracting-out delivery system in the three projects under 
investigation. However, mor~ contracting-out to a non-competitive 
private sector is not an optimum solution and could even be expected to 
yield poorer results than direct administration (production) by the 
monopolistic public sector. 
Although the evidence is sketchy, this hypothesis is supported by the 
experiei1ce of the Mission's low-income housing ~nd public services 
projects. Unquestionably the Private Sector Shelter Program (007) was 
the worst performer of the three, building high-cost houses which 
couldn't be sold except at a loss resulting in the decapitalization of 
FINAVI and its ultimate demise. The private sector firms involved in 
this program were also the least competitive. In three of the five 
sub-projects of ~his program, the private fi-ms were vertically 
integrated through interlocking directorates among suppliers, 
builder~/developers and savings and loan associations. La Constancia 
savings and loan association owners also owned two construction firms, 
La Promotora and La Constructora. Likewise, La Vivienda de Sula owned 
Honducas, the construr.tion firm which built San Jorge and La Mora. In 
addition, the building supply firms are owned by the same interests 
that own the S&Ls. These owners also had political connections with 
the Government of Honduras which began the program before the Mission 
assumed financial responsibility. There apparently was no bidding 
process involved, no community or public involvement in site selection 
or project design, and only minimal private financing of the 
contracting-out construction phase of the projects. Private, riskless, 
monopolistic profits were made on land deals, interest-free loans, and 
construction. Also, there is some evidence that the contractors were 
able to divert a considerable amount of the initial $5 million in cash 
from the Central Bank, in the form of interest-free construction 
financing funds, from the supplying of labor and materials. 
Losses of the savings and loan associations, which assumed the credit 
risk, are being reduced ~y the current activities of FOVI-which has 
replaced FINAVI. FOVI is presently engaged in selling the unsold 
housing units constructed and discounting the mortgages of units 
already sold. 
The Shelter for the Urban Poor Program (005) fared somewhat better than 
the Private Sector Shelter Program (007), in part, because the private 
sector participating was more competitive. Site selection, competitive 
bidding, and project design and monitoring were instituted at the start 
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and monitored by INVA. Problems surfaced, however, once the "turnkey 
system" was introduced with EI Sitio project. Site selection, quality 
control, and project design responsibilities were delegated to the 
private contract~r giving rise to a multitude of problems which 
culminated in an inability to ~ell the units or collect on the 
mortgages. In this case, t:,e develtiper owned the site~ and the project 
was intended to hp.ad off further squatter invasion on the land. 
Developed control of siting resulted in problems of both poor 
transportation and infrastructure. In addition, poor 
coordination/designation of responsibility among INVA/SANAA/developer 
resulted. As a consequence, there was inadequate drainage (and pre-
testing of soil drainage), inadequate water and sewer lines. Although 
the priv~te contractors were obliged to obtain their own financing 
under this system, the participating banks adopted a highly 
conservative position with respect to risk in these ventures. As a 
result, only the wealthiest, most liquid developers were financially 
able to participate in the projects. Thus did monopoly elements enter 
the process. 
Moreover, while INVA is, by law, required to accept the lowest bid from 
qualified private construction firms, there is no legal pbligation that 
these bids be competitively cost efficient or that they correspond to 
any standard reference costs. The particular engineering cost 
budgeting utilized in the bidding process obscures the true material, 
labor, and depreciation costs - to say nothing about profit. In 
response to this state of affairs, INVA has divided many of its 
projects into sub-prOjects and has awarded a number of private firms 
contracts within the same projects. In the p~ocess, lowest cost 
bidding is compromised. Contracting-out of construction to the private 
sector under the "turnkey system" has many advantages, but the "bugs" 
must be worked out. As a general guide, the entity which is 
responsible for selling the housing units should also be responsible 
for site selection, project design, and ~uality control. An unworkable 
division of responsibilities presently exists. Bidding, also, should 
be so designp.d as to ensure least cost production, not lowest cost bid. 
In the cost-plus contract, the contractor is reimbursed for all costs 
plus a fee; the government assumes practically all of the attendant 
risks. Finally, sold units currently up to date on mDrtgage payments 
und not constructed units should b~ the measure of program progress and 
success. The gist of all these is that if there is no incentive to 
produce at competitive least cost but only to produce at lowest bid 
(cost plus), the units will not be built at the lowest cost and will 
not be able to be sold to low-income families. 
The Urban Upgrading Program (006) has been generally considered the 
most successful of the Missions low-income housing/public services 
programs. Strictly speaking, it is not comparable to the other 
programs and delivers a distinct product as noted earli~r. This 
project, like others, contracts out to private firms the construction 
of water, sewerage, and pavement projects for the low income families 
of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The procedures used in this 
program, however, are superior inasmuch as there is more community 
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involvement, more control ~ver design and project supervIsIon, and a 
superior bidding procedure. There also exists competition for this 
program f,'om publicly direct administered production of public works. 
Both CMDC and MSPS as well as SANAA produce similar projects which 
serve as a reference for Mission contracting-out projects under this 
program. They help to ~nsure that fow private bids at less approximate 
costs of =onstruction by public entities. Competition from the private 
or public sector has the same effect as competition among private firms 
only. It is possible that bureaucratic inefficiencies may be no 
greater than normal competitive profits in such a case. 
Despit& the relative success of the Urban Upgrading Program, a number 
of similar problems exist. As pointed out above, off-site works, 
prOj2ct delays, and delinquencies in the collection of billings render 
the program less than an unqua:ified success. Again, the entity 
responsible for sales and cost col.ection should be the same as the one 
used in site selection, project design, and s~~ervision. Perhaps this 
project could be improved by reconsidering the contracting-out of 
supervIsIon. The key to contra~ting-out is to properly design the 
program or project and divide responsibilities clearly so as to achieve 
goals and objectives. This design and divisi~n can be learned from 
experience and comparative cost-benefit studies. That the communities 
agreed to pay for the services and then became delinquent on billings 
indicates that they either cannot payor refuse to pay. 
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TABLE 11-1 
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS IN HONDURAS 
1986 
(perce~tages) 
Metro Urban Rural 
Distribution of units by location 
Distribution of units by building 
materials: 
permanent 
semi-permanent 
improvised 
Total 
Percentage of units with 
adequate infrastructure: 
permanent 
semi-permanent 
improved 
Distribution of units by tenure: 
owned 
rented or leased 
squatters 
Total 
21 
78 
16 
6 
100 
5"/ 
71 
16 
38 
35 
27 
100 
9 
46 
29 
25 
100 
54 
51 
16 
53 
33 
14 
100 
70 
12 
16 
61 
100 
83 
34 
39 
86 
14 
100 
Source: Rourk, Phillip, et al., "Developing a Housing Finance 
Strategy for Honduras." The Urban Instituta for USAID 
Project 3597, June, 1986. 
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TABLE 11-2 
SUMMARY OF USAIDIHONDURAS URBAN SHELTER PROGRAMS: 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
FINANCIAL! URBAN SHELTER FOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS UPGRADING URBAN POOR (005) SHELTER (007) 
(006) 
1- Financing $10,000,000 
AID (1) 
crotal) 15,235,140 
2. Remaining AID 
Funds (1) 225,000 
3. Years Needed 
for Project 
Completion (1) 6.S 
--------------Years Planned 4=1.63% 
for Completion 
4. Constructed 
Output 
Planned Outputs 
Serviced lots 
Core units 
Basic hOuses 
Hom£' Irnprov. 111/2000=6% 
loans 
Families 
Assisted 9399/3100=30% 
5. Sold Outputs (2) 
Constructed 
Outputs 
6. Mortgage & 
loan interest 
rate (4) 
7. Loan Delinquencies 
Mortgages 
Home Improv. Loans 
17% (12 yrs) 
Urban Upgrading $328,602 
8. % Houses or 
Servic:es sold 
482,143= 67% 
$10,500,000 ($25,000,000) 
15,000,000 
16,487,000 17,075,000 
1,370,000 17,075,000 
6.5 6.5 
3= 2.17% 2.5= 2.60'l. 
579/2170= 27% 
1537/1310=117% 
5501860 = 6'+% 5511/6721 =82% 
1241/3000= 41% 
3907/6000=65% 20400/34600=59% 
609/972= 63% 2357/5511=43% 
12% (20 yrs) ~9.5% (20yrs) 
1516/2138=71% 1334/2360=57% 
1007/1241=81% 
to families 
above median 
income. 
Programmed Unit 
Cost in 008, 1984 (4) 
9. Programmed unit 
costs in projects 
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N/A 7% 25% 
Services lots 
Core units 
Basic houses 
Home Improv. loans 
$2486/1500=1.66 
3576/2500=1.43 
5827/3500=1.66 5827/3800=1.53 
1122/500 =2.24 
10.Host Government 
Employment 1981-86 +3000(5~) +210 (5b) (5c) 
II.Host Government 
Deficit 1981-86 (6a) (6b) (6c) 
12.Private Employment 
1981-86 (7) Ij,OOO(est) +15,500 +11,80e 
13.Nat'l Income 81-86 $30 million $33 million $34 mi 11 ion 
14.Actual Cost 
~ecovery/ 
Cost Recovery 
Expected 
2,191,000 
(1) From files of USAID/Honduras-Housing 
= 
(2) Audit of Honduras Housing Guarantee Program, Jan. 22, 1986. 
(Figures as of Sept., 1985). 
(3) El Sitio Project only. 
(4) AID Project Papers 005, 006, 007 and 008 
(5) 5A - CMOC+SANAA employment change; 
58 - INVA employment change; 
5C - FINAVI employment change 
(6) 6A - CMDC+SANAA deficits; 
68 - INVA deficit; 
6C - FINAVI deficit 
(7) Project Paper 005, 006, 007 target employment increases -
assuming the projects are completed in 1986 (007 15,000 
estimate based upon 005 criteria 10 jobs PQr $10,000 
investment) 
(8) Project expenditures (assumed expended by Dec. 1986) 
X multiplies of 2. Multiplier of 2 obtained from 
Economic Effects of Housing Investment (AID, Urban Institute 
1984). Rounded to nearest million. 
• 
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TABLE II-3 
UNIT CONSTRUCTION COST COMPARISONS OF TWO URBAN UPGRADING PROJECTS 
CONTRACTING-OUT VS. DIRECT ADMINISTRATION 
Layout 
Grading 
Excavation 
(not classified) 
8" concrete tubes 
OSCAR A. FLORES 
(CONTRACTING-OUT) 
UNIT UNIT QUANTITY 
PRICE 
ml 1.90 2,870 
ml 1.90 2,870 
m3 15.00 4,770 
ml 14.00 2,870 
Y connec tors 8" x6" IJ 24.00 361 
Installation 
8" tubes ml 4.85 2,870 
Compacting 
(select material> m3 13.00 280 
Monholes/metal 
covers u 900.00 30 
Tiedowns of 
concrete u 19.00 66 
Tiedowns of 
concrete? m3 
Cement covering 
tubes m3 468.00 12.5 
Hydrostatic test ml .70 2,870 
compacted Fill-in m3 2.10 2,720 
6" concrete tubes ml 10.50 1,810 
Installation 
6" tubes ml 4.10 1,810 
Inspection boxes u 118.30 361 
u = unit 
ml = linear meter 
m3 = cubic meter 
SAN JOSE 
(DIRECT ADMINSTRATION) 
UNIT PRICE QUANTITY 
1.67 340 
1.66 300 
26.05 437 
11.80 282 
20.42 25 
6.99 291 
16.70 35 
851.54 6 
196.80 00.30 
429.86 19.7 
1.56 291 
5.0 101 
9.37 30 
4.72 30 
111.81 30 
Note~ Only those units common to both projects were compared, 
they were, however, equal to about 95Y. of construction 
costs. 
Source: CMDC fi les 
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TABLE II-4 
GLOBAL COST COMPARISON OF TWO URBAN UPGRADING PROJECTS: 
CONTRACTING-OUT VS. DIRECT"ADMINISTRATION 
OSCAR A. FLORES 
(AID CONTRACTING-OUT) 
LM Y. TOTAL 
1. Cost of 
con=truction 
2. Materials-AID 
3. Materials-CMDC 
4. Cost of Super-
vision 
5. Cost of Design -
AID 
6. Cost of Design -
At1DC 
7. Pro jec t 
Registration 
8. Administrative 
Expenditures (2) 
9. General Expend. 
10. Finance 
11. Fee for connec-
tion to City 
System 
12. Deed transfer 
SANAA 
13. Urforseen Expenses 
14. Total cost of 
431,277 
project 662,783 
No. family 
connections 361 
Linear meters 2,870 
15. Average cost per 
family 1,195 
(not counting 
interest charges) 
16. Average cost per 
meter 150 
co::;r 
65 
06 
05 
(1) 
08 
(1) 
06 
10 
(1) 
100 
(1) Less ~han 1/2 of lY. of project costs. 
SAN JOSE 
(DIRECT ADMINISTRATION) 
LM Yo TOTAL 
92,867 
117,813 
67 
513 
1,386 
181 
COST 
80 
02 
08 
(1) 
03 
06 
01 
100 
(2) Estimated at lOY. of the combined costs of construction, 
supervision, and design 
Source: Files of CMDC 
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CHAPTER 3 
PRIMAnv SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION 
A. Background 
The Honduran educational system suffers from some serious problems that 
appear at times to be overwhelming. The major problems relate to rural 
educational delivery systems, access of the rural population to 
schools, retention and desertion of school age children, deficient and 
non-existent rural schools, and under-trained rural primary school 
teachers. 
The Ministry of Public Education (MOE) is well awa"e of these problems. 
Considerable public expenditure~ are made in public education 
representing over 25% of the national budget. Recurrent costs are high 
in relation to outputs. Educational internal efficiency rates are low 
with considerably high levels of repetition and drop-out rates. The 
Ministry is placing emphasis on rural primary school construction, 
teacher tlaining, and administration management improvem2nts. 
International donors such as AID, the ~crld Bank, and the Inter-
American Development Bank al~ stress rural primary sr.hool education. 
There is consensus on the nuclearization concept in which older 
students in grades 3-6 go to a central school. International donors 
have paid a good deal of attention to school construction. 
The Ministry of Public Education uses the direct administration 
procedure for school construction of rural primary schools and 
contrnct.ing out for larger urban schools. School construction is 
handled in the Directorate of School Construction within MOE. In 
addition, each of the donor agencies is contained within the MOE in 
terms of fund accounting. The reason for these separate "project 
units" is that there are slight differences between donors and MOE in 
terms of what each is willing to fund from their account. More will be 
said on this below. 
B. Educational Programs 
AID/Honduras has had a long history of supporting rural primary school 
construction in Honduras. Loan No. 522-V-027, Loan No. 522-V-031, Loan 
No. 522-0119 have had rural primary school construction components. 
More recently, ?roject No. 522-0167, Rural Primary Schools, is a four 
year project to end in December, 1986 with a $13,850,000 loan and $ 
1,150,000 grant that is to 1) construct 2,100 new classrooms and 
remodel 1,000 classrooms in 7 departments, 2) construct 600 teacher 
housing units, 3) construct a teacher training center, 4) provide 
teacher training for rural primary school teachers, and 5) set-up an 
information and data collecting system within the Ministry of 
Education. The amendments changed certain project components. 
The newest project, No. 522-0273 Primary Education Efficiency, is 
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designed to improve the quality of the primary education syst~m through 
educational innovations to reduce dropout and repetition rates, lower 
unit costs, improve the quality of instruction, and incrp.a~e academic 
achievement. This new project, beginning in late 1986, hus tl',e 
following seven components: 
1. Textbook writing and printing for all si¥. grades. 
2. National In-Service Teacher Training for Primary School 
Teachers. 
3. Administrative and Policy Analy~is Program, a resear~h division 
or "think tank" to assess alternative educationa~ policy 
directions. 
4. Computerized MOE Management I~formation System. A continu~~ion 
and reinforcement of previous activities under the Project 
No. 522-0167 program. 
5. Testing and EvaluatIon Program for Academic Standards 
6. School construction, renovation, and maintenance. 
7. Interactive Radio Education Program by Private Sector. (a.c-
AID, 1986) 
This edlJcatior;al reform project has a $22.0 million grant and a 
$5.5 million loan over an eight year period. 
The other leading international donors in education are the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank. The World Bank supported for 
mary years the nuclearization concept and assisted in, building several 
thousand classrooms. After a lapse of several years they are now 
gearing up to contribute once more, They are presently sponsoring an 
educational mapping survey to determine educational construc~ion needs 
in the rural areas. 
The Inter-American Dev'?lcpment Bank is currently using the "contractirrg 
out" method to construct larger high schools, technical institutes, and 
teacher training centers. At present they are not building rural 
primary schools. 
It should be p~inted out that the General Dirp.ctorate of School 
Construction (oGCE) is us1ng "contracting out·, for constructing five 
larger educational institutes and teacher training centers. However, an 
assessment of those pro~edures is not included in this study because 
they do not relate to rural primary schools. 
C. Institutional Analysis 
1. Direct Administration of MOE Construction 
The DGCE relies mainly on a direct admInistration approach to build 
rural schools. First, it provides a simple school design for rural 
areas. It uses a force account reimbursable (FAR) system for school 
construction. It calls its system ayuda mutua, or self-help 
construction. It prefers to have the local community be involved in 
what it calls self-help construction. The local community provides 
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land, loc~l materials( sand, gravel),and in-kind labor by community 
members. The Mi~jstry can provide skilled masons when necessary, 
additional materials, steel, bricks, cement, and whatever other 
materials and supplies are required 'that the community cannot provide. 
The Ministry also provides a social ·promoter who is to stimulate the 
community to get involved in the school construction. This person also 
assists in school construction s~pervision. 
In other communities that already have schools, the Ministry makes an 
inspection of existing schools to determine if they need to be repaired 
or upgraded. If it is determined that such repair is needed, the 
Ministry follows procedures similar to those described above to solicit 
self-help construction. 
Since the DGCE attempts to maxImIze the number of schools to be built 
or renovated, it prefers strongly the self-help construction concept; 
there is an outstanding demand of uver 1,000 communities that have 
requested schools and therefore it can exer~ pr~ssure on local 
communities for ill-kind labor contributions. 
The bGCE has three types of school construction, the prices of which 
vary: adobe, brick, and cement block. The community is encouraged to 
contribute as much as possible. Und~r the DGCE approach the community 
is usually required to provide the skilled mason and transport the 
Ministry-supplied materials. (AID provides funding for both the mason 
and for transport of supplies to the construction site) Again, the 
Ministry of Education is attempting to utilize as many community 
resources as possible. 
In 1986 the DGCE has constructed 336 classrooms in about 150 
communities using the self-help construction method. It takes about 8-9 
months to complete. The community provides 45X and t~e MOE 55X of 
construction costs. The MOE maintains engineering and supervis!on 
control through its 17 engineers and 10 social promoters who visit the 
school construction continually. 
2. MOE/AID Constru~tion Procedures 
The MOE/AID Project Unit utilizes both direct administration and 
contracting out. The AID Primary School Project No. 522-0167 
construction component has a separate project unit. Although 
theoretically under the DGCE, it has worked fairly independently. The 
unit proceeded independently in using the contracting out method in 
1984-86. The whole project is under the General Coordinator for the 
Primary Education/AID Project. (8.B- AID, 1980) 
The goal of the AID School Construction Project Unit i~ to provide 
2,100 new classrooms and to renovate 1,000 classrooms by the end of 
1986. The project was to use the self-help approach. By e~rly 1984 the 
project output was about two years behind schedule. The principal 
reasons were 1) serious delays in obtaining materials approved by the 
Proveeduria, and 2) lack of community involvement partially because of 
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delays. (8.A- MOE, 1985) 
In March, 1984 Amendment No.4 of the AID-MOE Agreement stipulated that 
private firms would be contracted to build 1,100 classrooms because of 
construction delays. (8.H- AID, 198~) This was meant to be a short term 
method used by AID/Honduras and the MOE to achieve the construction 
goals in time. Thi~ approach was envis~oned as an emergency measure and 
not a fundamental shift in approaches. 
By March 30, 1985, according to the MUE evaluation, 1,097 classrooms 
had been constructed, representing 52% of th~ project goal. Delays 
caused construction costs to rise and made tho:: MOE unable to reach its 
goals of 2,100 classrooms. They decided, then, to have the private 
sector build 300 classrooms in Yoro Department and another 300 in Santa 
Barbara. Another 300 classrooms have been contracted, yielding a total 
of 900 classrooms. (8.A- MOE, 1985) The Moe/AID Project Unit will 
reach its goal of 2,100 classrooms by the end of 1986. 
Forty-five Honduran construction firms were pre-qualified for bidding. 
Twel ve construc t ion fi n,s were selected. The MOE provided "pre-
determined price mechanism" so that bidders did not have trJ submi t 
lowest bids, but rather were awarded blocks of classrooms to build. 
Therefore, there was no competition per se. Rather, contractors 
received contracts on a fixed price plus fee basis, relying on MOE 
reference unit prices. Special contracts were written for these twelve 
contractors to build the 900 classrooms in Santa Barbara, Yoro, 
Comayagua, and Intibuca Departments. Some of the basic agreements of 
interest in contracting out taken from the document "Contractual Base;;" 
are: 
o Contract was to perform using pre-determined price 
mechanism. Administrative and contingency funds were added as 
well as a regulated profit margin. 
a Packages or groups were given to each contractor in the same 
locale within a given department. 
a Fixed price contracts were used based on the pre-determined 
costs. No cost reimbursement mechanism was used. 
a A 20Y. guarantee bond was required. This bond was required to 
be held with a local surety or insuranc.e institution. 
a A lOY. quality work bond was required and was valid for one 
year after terminating the project. 
a A lOY. deduction was made from each payment to cover any 
complaints or non-payments. It was paid back after the one 
year period. 
a A 10% advance was given to the contractor. 
a A fine of L500 was assessed against the contractor for each 
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calender day delay. (8.E- MOE, 1984) 
In total 19 contracts were written with 12 construction firms. There 
was an average of about 50 classrooms per block and per contractor. 
The housing units component was to provide housing units for rural 
primary school teacher~ in communities requesting teachers housing to 
encourage teachers to live in the communities. Modest tea~her housing 
units were built using the same self-help construction approach. This 
component has been less successful, in part because communities 
r~questing these units have not been forthcoming in assisting in 
ct;)r.st.l"\jr.t.ion. 
The original project goal was to build 600 teacher housing units. Only 
seven units were cc.nstrllc.ted. The rest of this component has been 
stopped and project funds reprogrammed into school construction. The 
initial assessment of teacher housing needs and desire was not 
justified. 
3. Direct Administration and Con~racting Out 
Direct administration is the norm for the MOE/DGCE. Contracting out 
was utilized f0r a two year period only in order to speed up 
~onstructior.. TherEfore, the same procedures of direct administration 
were used during this period with considerable duplication of effort. 
The perception of an "emergency situation" meant that long-term chanqes 
in administrative procedures were not implemented. It is fair to say 
that the USAID rUssion to Honduras and the Pro jed Uni t of the Mimstry 
of Public Education are convincej of the more cost-effective manner of 
self-help construction. This was reiterated in the Project Paper No. 
522-0273 Primary Education Efficiency. (8.C- AID, 1986) Even 50, it is 
important to assess the advantages and disadvantages of either system. 
80th AID/Honduras and MOE officials report that the overall cost 
to the MOE is lower using the directly administered self-help approach 
to school construction. Yet it is important to assess overall costs, 
both direct community costs and in-kind costs in order to make a fair 
comparison. 
(a) Design criteria 
There are no differences between direct administration and contracting 
~ut by the MOE. In both cases, MOE design criteria of the planning 
office are used. 
(b) Land 
Again there are few differences. Under btith direct administration and 
contracting out, land for construction is donated by the community. 
However, it was noted by several sources that the communities h~ve less 
interest in obtaining land for contractors since there wer~ certain 
fears and that the contractors would acquire the land. There are, 
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however, no clear examples of this happening. 
(c) Promotion 
In both ca~es, the Ministry provide~ the c~mrnunity with ~ocial 
promoters. There are 10 DGCE and 6 DGCE/AID Prc2ect Unit social 
promoters. Their role is to pruvide both guidance and encouragement to 
community efforts. Social promoters noted, however, that under the 
guidelines of the contracting out relationship they spend about half as 
much time in the communities. It would seem that the sense of 
involvement of the community and the promoter is less evident in the 
contract relationship. 
(d) Skilled labor 
Under most MOE project guidelines, the MOE obligates the community to 
acquire the services of a qualified foreman and mason on their own. The 
community must pay for these services. In the case of the AID Project 
Unit within MOE, the Unit pays for the skilled masonry person. In the 
contract relationship, the contractor pays for the services of t.he 
mason. Thus, the community bears an added cost under the direct 
administration by the MOE. 
(e) Construction Materials 
Under direct admin-stration, sand, gravel, and rocks are normelly 
provided by the co~munity. How~ver, there are numerous exce~tions to 
this policy. The intent by AID and MOE is to maximize com~unity input 
and pal"ticipation ana to minimize direct government costs. In the case 
of the MOE, even th~ costs of transport of materials to the 
construction site is assumed to be a responsibility of the community. 
AID funded projects do provide for transport costs. In the case of 
contr&cting out, the co~tractor assumES all of these (reimbur5dble) 
costs. This is a key factor e)(plainin~1 price and time differentials. 
Directly aci:ninistered projects utiliz.ng community self-help require up 
to six months for the acquisition of supplies because of the need to 
obtain approval f~om the Proveeduria. Contractors can acquire supplies 
immediately. Once again, construction delay is money, and the 
bureaucratic requirements of the MOE mean additional costs. While it 
is not possible to give accurate cost estimates of this addition~l 
cost, it does exist. 
(f) Administration 
In ~he case of directly administered projects there is close 
supervision in the conslruction process. There are 80 MOE and 40 AID-
funded Project Unit people --engineers, social promoters, accountants, 
architects--who participate in the administrative functions. The 
Contractor provides his own personnel. In the contract relationship, 
tne AID Project Unit writes contracts, sets bidding procedures, and 
supervises the construction. Contracts are fixed fee and there is no 
least cost bidding procedure. Supervision could be reduced by as much 
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as 50% with contracting out. This is an obvious difference in approach, 
and an area for considerable potential cost reductions and lowering of 
recurrent costs of the public sector over the long run. However, there 
were no reductions in the si~e of the MOE staff as a result of the use 
of contracting out, because contracting was viewed as simply an 
emergency response and not the modus vivendi of school construction 
projects. 
(g) Quality of Construction 
There are few apparent differences in the quality of the constructed 
school under either system. With external supervision by MOE personnel 
(in the case of direct administration and self-help) or by a contract 
engineer (in the case of contracting) acceptable quality schools are 
constructed. One safeguard against poor construction in the case of 
contracting is that five percent of the fixed contract amount is 
deducted and retained to cover debts and claims brought against the 
contractor subsequent to construction. 
(h) Maintenance 
There are significant differences in the two approaches. Where the 
community has been involved in the construction (under direct 
administration and self-help) there is a real sense that the school 
belongs to them. As a result, commitment to maintenance is higher. 
With contracting out, the contractor's responsibility ends with the 
completion of the structure and the school is "turned over" to the MOE. 
Table 111-1 graphically describes these various arrangements. 
(i) Community Labor 
Under direct administration, the community provides unskilled labor for 
levelling, grading, laying foundations, mixing cement, and hauling 
materials, all on an in-kind basis equalling as much as 30-40% of total 
classroom construction costs. With contracting out, the contractor 
assumes the CJsts of manual labor whether it is derived from the 
community or his own crews. That cost forms part of his overall costs. 
Thus, the in-kind contribution as a cost reduction to government is 
lost under contracting out. 
D. Economic Analysis 
1. Background 
Between 1974 and 1978, 2,747 clas:~ooms were built in rural areas. At 
the time of the signing of the program agreement in 1980, it was 
estimated that about 3,000 rural classrooms would be required to 
achieve full enrollment of rural priMary age students. (8.8- AID, 1980) 
For the years 1980-1985, rural primary school enrollment was expected 
to increase by 25% to 387,000 students. To accommodate this increase, 
2,100 new classrooms were planned to be constructed and 1,000 existing 
classrooms to be renovated over the years 1981-1985. In addition, 600 
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teachers' houses were to be constructed. The monthly production target 
was 50 classrooms. The program complemented the activities of the 
World Bank which constructed 813 additional classrooms. 
Joint efforts by these programs and:several others (eg., CARE) were 
intended to supply the increasing demand for classrooms in the rural 
communities of Honduras. The demand for rural classrooMs was studied 
and projected, the necessary supplV was estimated, and financing was 
obtained. Initially, AID provided $13,850,000 in loans (40 years at 2% 
and 3Yo with a ten year grace period) and $1,150,000 in grants (Table 
111-2). 
2. Construction Delays and Related Costs 
The classrooms and teachers' houses were to be built by the DGCE by 
direct administration and utilizing community participation. By March 
of 1984 only about 490 classrooms had been completed (Table 111-3). 
Initially, the program contemplated the completion of all 2,100 
classrooms by 1984 (Table 111-2). 
There ~re several reasons for the failul"e of the program to meet its 
objectives on schedule. While factors such as the change in government 
and the dramatic effects of the 1980-82 recession were important 
external factors, so too were factors related to the administrative 
approach: implementation problems within MOE and procurement delays in 
interactions with Proveeduria were critical.(8.J- AID, 1985) 
Most often cited were the material supply problems associated with the 
Proveeduria. In many cases, up to six months lapsed between the time 
classroom construction material was authorized and delivery to the 
construction site. In part, these difficulties were bureaucratic and 
had to do with the fact that the Proveeduria is, by law, required to 
seek at least three bids for all purchases. These problems also 
stemmed from the fact that material purchases for classroom 
construction was a new and significantly large task for which MOE had 
no prior experience. Finally, the procedure utilized in classroom 
construction required a new intergovernmental relationship between two 
government entities-- the MOE and the Proveeduria. (8.A- MOE, 1985) 
AID restructured the construction phase of the program in March, 1984 
with Amendment 4. Under this amendment, the same targets of 2,100 new 
classrooms and 600 renovated classrooms were set. Teacher housing was 
dropped and $800,000 in additional grants was reprogrammed tu the 
program. Most significant of all, for purposes of this report, the 
institutional arrangements of the delivery system of the program was 
altered from one of classroom construction by direct administration 
(and self-help) to one of contracting-out to private firms for the 
construction of 900 of the 2,100 classrooms. (8.H- AID, 1984) In March 
of 1985, $3,000,000 in additional loans and $600,000 in grants was 
added to the program for the construction of 285 classrooms also to be 
construction by private firms under contracting-out procedures (8.K-
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AID, 1985). One additional year was added to the program and the 
completion date for the program was moved forward to April 1986. 
Finally, 100 additional new classrooms were programmpd for construction 
bringing the total to 2,200. 
Since March, 1985, production of new classrooms intreased at a rapid 
pace and much of the time lo~t between 1981 and 1984 was compensated 
for as seen in Table 111-4. Approximately 1559 new classrooms were 
constructed by 1984 and 2027 new classrooms were completed by November 
of 1986. This phenomenal progress has been attributed to the shift to 
the delivery system utilizing private construction firms contracted to 
build ~ural classrooms for the MOE. 
In the switch from direct administration to contracting-out to private 
construction of classrooms in 1984, the institutional arrangements of 
the program's delivery ~ystem were fundamentally altered as seen also 
in Table III-I. By reducing community involvement, this method of 
delivery has been able to meet targeted objectives much more rapidly 
than the earlier direct administration (self-help) arrangement. In by-
passing the Proveeduria for the procurement of materials, much time was 
saved. This is reflected in the statistics on work completed in Table 
111-4. In comparing time of delivery, therefore, contracting-out was 
significantly faster than direct administration. The program required 
one additional year and additional financing to meet the targeted 
objectives. 
3. Cost Comparisons 
Table 111-5 lists the projected costs of new classrooms during the 
period 1981-85. Initially, it was estimated that a new classroom under 
direct administration would cost approximately L10,000. This cost 
estimation was based upon 10 representative classroom construction 
samples taken in 1979 and projected through the expected life of the 
program - until 1985. Included was a 12X per annum inflationary 
factor. Community contributions were assumed to equal 24X of direct 
costs although these costs varied from project to project, from 9% to 
28.6X. (8.D-AID, 1985) 
The MOE did not include the value of community contributions since for 
the Government of Honduras the opportunity cost of self-help is zero. 
In computing true engineering costs, however, the community 
contributions should be added as costs-in-kind. The MOE also estimated 
that its administrative and financial costs were lOX of direct costs 
and these costs also were not considered as project costs and excluded 
from the cost calculations for the construction of a rural classroom. 
Table 111-6 shows that if th~se two costs, community (self-help) 
contributions of L2,400 and indirect costs of administration and 
finance of L1,000, are added to the direct costs of "self-help" 
construction costs, we obtain a total cost figure of L13,400. The real 
costs of direct administration is only L600 less than the fixed price 
reimbursed under contracting-out private construction in 1986. In 
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addition, if we make adjustments for the 5Y. "future claims" deduction 
from the contractors fee, costs are virtually identical! 
Consequently, there is virtually no .actual cost difference between the 
two delivery systems when all the mon~tary and in-kind costs are 
properly accounted for. Thus, the statement tha~ the classrooms built 
by direct administration with self-help are 50% cheaper (8S-AID, 1980) 
appears to be somewhat misleading. They were cheaper for the project 
component, but there was no significant difference in the overall 
actual construction costs of the two approaches. 
The discrepan~ies about the relative cost efficiency of these two 
delivery system is due to a failure to include all relevant costs. In 
effect, the self-help, direct administration, constructions utilized 
community labor and in-kind material contribution in lieu of a user 
fee. Consequently, the money cost of a new classroom to the MOE and 
AID was lower than it was under contracting-out of schoolroom 
construction to private firms. With the switch to contracting-out, 
this community contribution was lost. In one ~~nse, the use of 
communi ~~' labor served to avo id (at least minimally) the "free-rider" 
problem .::;f a public good: beneficiaries were "charged" for the service. 
However, the switch to contracting out meant that the public sector 
absorbed these costs, and beneficiaries could avoid the "use charge." 
This additional cost burden to government, however, has been assumed in 
the loan. Tables 111-7 and 111-8 show that MOE paid private firms 
under contracting-out approxh~ately twice as much as AID r~imbursed the 
MOE under direct administr~tion for the construction of a similar rural 
classroom under this program. 
50me of the higher costs und~r c~ntracting out is also due to price 
increases to adjust for inflation. This is curious inasmuch as a 12% 
inflationary factor was initially built into the projected costs of 
construction as pointed out above. Moreover, inflation in Honduras 
dUiing the years 1980-1985 did not exceed lOX per year, at best. With 
a f!xed price contract based upon an actual cost study ~s was the case 
with this program, it is difficult for private construction firms to 
reduce costs. Therefore, one way to consider profits is to seek and 
obtain increases in the fixed price~ of their contracts. 
The shift to contracting-out meant that only half as many classrooms 
could be constructed with the same m~ney assistance or that the money 
assistance would have to be doubled. AID and the MOE chose the latter 
course. In 1984 and 1985, $4.6 million was added to the approximately 
$16 million programmed for this purpose. Thus $4.6 million plus the 
$1.7 million of the abandoned teachers' housing segment of the program 
comes to $6.3 million. By calculating that about 1/4 of the program was 
advanced as of March 1984 with the shift to contracting-out, 3/4 of the 
program remained to be disbursed - or $12 million. Thus the augmented 
financing of $6.3 million provided the needed 50% increase required by 
the full cost reimbursement with contracting-out of rural school 
construction of classrooms. 
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In essence, increased loans were substituted for in-kind community 
contributions to the program as a result of the shift to contracting-
out. The henefit was a faster deli~ery system and a prOject completed, 
more or less, on schedule. The cost was a higher monetary expenditure 
on the part of the GOH as well as an increased foreign debt. 
In conclusion, the experience with both direct ndministration and 
contracting-out under the Rural Primary Education Program during the 
years 1980-1986 revealed the following: 
o The program r~quired more finances and more time to complete than 
originally programmed. 
o The increased time was due to a failure of direct administra-
tion with self-help to construct classrooms on schedule. 
o Direct administration utiliz~d community resources and was less 
costly to project proponents in monetary terms than contracting-
out. 
o The increased financial cost of the program was due to the 
switch to contracting-out which reimbursed full actua! costs 
of construction. 
o With the faster construction contracting-out the project required 
only an additional year's extension for completion. Time delay is 
money, particlllarly in infrastructural development. 
o When all actual costs, monetary and non-monetary are considered, 
the costs of construction of rural classrooms by the two 
approaches are virtually identical. 
ASPECTS 
OF PROGRAM 
Community 
Promot ion 
Project Design 
Land 
Material 
Labor 
Transport 
Tools &. Equip. 
Other 
Administration 
Supervision 
Finance 
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TABLE I II-I 
DIVISION OF TASKS BETWEEN PRIVATE, PUBLIC 
AND COMMUN i.TY I N THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF RURAL. PRIMARY CLASSROOMS 
DIRECT ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING-OUT 
(SELF-HELP) 
PRIVATE PUBLIC COMMUNITY PRIVATE PUBLIC COMMUNITY 
li )«1> 
)( )( 
)( )( 
)( )( )( )( (2 ) 
)( )( )( )( (2 ) 
)( )( 
)( )( 
)( )( 
)( )«3) )«3) 
)( )«4) )«4) 
)( )( )( )( )«2) 
--------.. _-----_._---------------------------------------
(1) Comruunity promoters are used in both direct administration and 
contracting out of classroom construction. Roughly twice as much 
time and rescurces are used in direct administration for this 
activity than in contracting-out, according to community promoters 
at the Ministry of Education. 
(2) Community contributions of Ll,OOO and construction materials were 
eliminated in 1985 for contracting-out but continue for direct 
administration construction of classrooms. 
(3) MOE administers the overall project whereas the private firms 
administer the construction component only. 
(4) Supervi~ion and inspection is done both by the Government (MOE) 
and by AID private consultants. 
AID 
AID 
New 
room 
loan 
grant 
PROJECT 
PAPER (0167) 
(JUNE 1980)(1) 
$13,850,000 
1,250,000 
Class-
2,100 
Construction 
Project Goal 
43 
TABLE III-2 
FINANCIAL·SUMMARY: 
RURAL PRIMARY. EDUCATION 
(US$) 
AMENDMENT NO. 4 
(MARCH 1984) (2) 
ADDITIONAL TOTAL 
FINANCING 
( MARCH, 1985) ( 3 ) 
$3,000,000 $16,850,000 
800,000 * 600,000 2,850,000* 
100 2,200 
* Between June 1980 and March 1984, $200,000 in additional grant 
money was added to this program 
Sources: 
(1) Project Paper Rural Primary Education (0167), June 1980. 
(2) AID/GOH, "AID Loan No. 522-V-040 and Project No. 522-0167, Project 
Amendatory Agreement No.4," March 6, 1984. 
(3) Cable AID/Wash to AID/Honduras, March 5, 1985. 
AID Loan 
522-V-031 
World Bank 
Schools 
This Project 
522-0167 
Nat'l Program 
Present Stock 
TOTAL NUMBER 
OF CLASSROOMS 
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TABLE II 1-3 
PRIMARY SCHOOL CLASSROOM PROJECT 
1979 19130 1981 1982 1983 1984 
130 250 299 299 299 299 
40 170 350 530 558 
480 1,170 1,782 2,100 
200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 
13,340 13,219 12,920 12,546 12,199 12,010 
13,670 13,909 14,469 15,165 15,810 16,167 
Source: Project Paper, Rural Primary Education (522-0167), June 
1980. 
Completed 
classrooms 
Additional 
classrooms 
Latrines 
Water 
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TABLE 111-4 
WORK COMPLETED UNDER PROGRAM RURAL 
PRIMARY EDUCATION (0167) 
VARIOUS YEARS 
DEC. 1982 MARCH 1984 MARCH 1985 NOV. 1986 
(1) (3) (4) 
246 255 1,559 2,027 
184 235 
409 393 
169 99 
Note: Project Agreement signed 31 July, 1980, Project Implemented 
August, 1981. 
Sources: 
(1) Mejoramiento de la Educaci~n Rural Primaria: An~lisis de Eje-
cuci6n Projecto AID/GOH 522-0167, June, 1983. 
(2) Project 522-0167 Construction Component Status as of March 
31, 1984 (from files of AID/Honduras). 
(3) Cable AID /Wash to AID/Honduras, March 5, 1985 augmented 
financial assistance to the projec~ $3 million additional 
loans and $600,000 additional grants. 
(4) From the files of Engineering Dept., USAID/Honduras 
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TABLE I II-5 
PROJECTED AVERAGE COST PER CLASSROOM 
1981~.1985 
(Lempi:-as) 
PP (1) CS (2) 
1981-82 9,438 
1982-83 9,438 9,135 
1983-84 9,438 10,117 
1984-85 9,438 10,752 
1986 
AC = New complete four-sided classroom 
AA = Three sided additional classroom 
Sources: 
CB (3) 
13,744-AC 
11,598-AA 
CB (4) 
14,090-AC 
11 ,886-AA 
(1) Project paper, Rural Primary Education (0167), June 1981; 
(2) Construction Summary Nov., 1992; 
(3) Costos Base por Modulo Tipo, Por Paquete y Por Sistema 
Construccion, MDE, 1984; 
(4) Costos Base por Modulo Tipo, Por Paquete y Por Sistema 
Construccion, MDE, 1985 (anticipated cost reduced 
the L10,000 estimate to L9,438. 
Direct Costs 
Material 
Tools &. Equip. 
Transportation 
Labor 
Other 
Sub-Total I 
Less: Community 
Contribution Equal 
to 24% direct cost 
Sub-Total I I 
Indirect Costs 
Administration 
Finance 
Project 
Sub-Total III 
TOTAL 
Plus Community 
r,ontr ibut ion 
OVERALL TOTALS 
Notes: 
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TABLE 111-6 
COSTS PER 'CLASSROOM 
(Lempiras) 
1982 (1) 
(DIRECT ADMINISTRATION) 
L. 6,400 
900 
1,900 
800* 
L,10 ,OOC 
2,400 
L. 7,600 
L, 1,000 
L. 1,000*** 
L, 8,600 
L, 4,800 
C,13,400 
1986 (2) 
(CONTRACTING-OUT) 
L, 6,103 
1,315 
2,773 
335 
L.I0,526 
0 
L,10,526 
L. 3,563 
L,14,089 
L.14089 
* Other direct costs include costs of assistant supervisors, 
mechanics, drivers, warehouseman, watchmen, ~'~rnpers, 
warehouse rental, contingencies, social security, and fringe 
benef it!:;. 
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** Costs to the private construction firm such as administration 
overhead, legal, bank finance charges (4 months), and a 
"reasonable profit". These costs are estimated at 35~ of 
direct costs. 
*** Imputed costs to the Ministry of Education are equivalent 
to financial operating costs with external funds. Estimated 
to be 1~ of direct costs. 
Sources: 
(1) "Project Paper Rural Primary Education (0167)," AID, June 
1980. Co~t figures based upon 10 representative samples taken 
in 1979.Projected costs through 1985 based upon inflation rate 
of 12~ per year. 
(2) "Costas base par Modulo Tipo par Paquete y Sistema 
Constructi va' "Mi nistry of Educat ion,1986. Costs based upon 
1000 classrooms built prior to 1984, and used to determine 
reference costs for t.he units to be produced by contracting out 
of construction to private firms (Complete, four sided classroom 
figures used here - an average of the four types of construction 
used: 
1. Cement stabilized adobe walls, 
clay tile floors, timber roof 
truss with clay tile 
2. Brick walls, concrete floor, 
glasslouvered windows, timb-
er roof truss covered with 
cement asbestos roofing 
sheets. 
3. Concrete block walls,con-
crete slab floor, wood-
louvered windows, timber 
roof truss, cement usbes-
tos roofing sheets. 
4. Wood panel walls, concrete 
slat floor, wood louvered 
windows, timber roof 
truss, cement asbestos 
roofing sheets. 
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TABLE II 1-7 
AID REIMBURSEMENT OF·CONSTRUCTION COSTS: 
Comp!ete Classroom 
Addt'l Classroom 
Latdnes 
Potable Water 
Source~i· : 
NEW CLASSROOMS UNDER FAR 
(Lempiras) 
DIRECT ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING-OUT (3) 
1983 (1) 1984 (2) 1985 1986 
L 6,000 L 7,850 L 13,744 L 14,090 
5,100 6,475 11 , 598 11 , 866 
1,000 1,300 1,956 2,029 
600 600 852 866 
(1) Situacion de Reembolsos de los Proyectos del Pr~stamo 
AID 522-V-040 hasta 1 de abril de 1983. 
(2) Costas reembolsables para construccion nueva, Carta de Ejecu-
cion No. 81, 15 de marzo de 1984. 
(3) Costas base par Modulo Tipo par Paquete y par Sistema 
Constructivo, MOE, 184 Y 1985. 
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TABLE II 1-8 
AID REIMBURSEMENT PER UNIT OF CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTED 
(Lempiras) 
One Complete Classroom, 
One Latrine, One Potable Water 
One Complete Classroom, 
One Additional Classroom, 
One Latrine, One Potable Water 
APRIL 1983 (1) NOVEMBER 1986 
L. 7,000 L. 16,985 
L .12,100 L. 29,680 
Note: One extra latrine, an additional L. 1,000; one rain 
depository potable water system, an additional L. 600. 
Sources: 
(1) Situaci&n de reembolsos de los proyectos del pr~stamo 
AID 522-V-040, hasta 1 de abril de 1983. 
(2) Costas base par modulo tipo, par paquete y par sistema 
constructivo, MOE, 1985. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RURAL ROADS CONSTRUCTION 
A. 'ackground 
Until recently, the Honduran Government placed a major emphasis on 
major paved hi9hways to connect the different regions of the country. 
In the 1980s there has been increased interest in feeder and access 
roads. The Government attempts to open up new feeder roads and to 
rehabilitate old and poorly cor.structed rural trails. 
It was estimated by the Ministry of Communications, Public Works, and 
Transportation (SECOPT) that there were over 5,000 kilometers of access 
roads that are substandard and in various states of need for repair. 
SECOPT estimates that over 800,000 people can be affected positively by 
upgraded roads (14.A-AID, 1985). 
The justification for feeder or access roads is for rural families to 
gain better access to primary agricultural markets and to secondary 
markets. These roads also allow rural families to gain access to 
health, education, and other services. 
B. Rural Road Programs 
AID/Honduras has been engaged in assisting rural road construction for 
at least the last 20 years. More recently, it has assisted with the 
following projects: 
o Agricultural Sector I Project No. 522-025 
1970-75: agricultural project that had 300 kms of feeder 
roads constructed. The Ministry of Communications, Public 
Works, and Transportation( SECOPT) had its own equipment and 
built the roads themselves using direct administration. 
o Rural Rer.onstruction II Project No. 522-030 
1976-80: reconstruction of roads after Hurricane Fifi. Built 
and reconstructed 300 kms of roads using direct 
administration method by having own equipment and machinery 
and also contracting out to private contractors under close 
supervision of SECOPT. 
o Rural Trails Project 522-035 
1980-1986: construction and rehabilitation of 1,500 kms of 
roads. Project winding down as of end of 1986. Uses 
contractors who provide machinery and equipment. 
o Rural Roads II Project No. 522-052. 
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1987-1990: new project to build or rehabiltate additional 
1,000 kms roads in North C,ast, tIle Central Valleys, and th~ 
Western Highlands. This is. $36.167 million project with AID 
$20 million loan, $1.315 million grant, and $14.852 million 
GOH contribution. A major feature i~ using some contracting 
out for machinery and equipment and additional requirement of 
maintenance by the General Directorate of Mainten~nce (DGM). 
The additional component for this new project is operation 
and maintenance. 
Other multilateral donors-- Inter-American Development Bank and the 
World Ban~-- also supported SECOPT in rural road construction. The 
projects supported by those donors use a system in which the contractor 
has much more responsibility for design, construction, quality control, 
and final responsibility than with the AID projects. 
A rural roads project directly administered by SEC OPT , using national 
funds, Inter-American Development Bank loans, and bilateral assistance 
from the German and Swiss Governments, is based on manual labor. In 
this approach, the SECOPT personnel are much more involved in direct 
administration of the project and contract directly for machir.ery and 
equipment at the most minimal level. The primary focus of these efforts 
is the utilization of self-help community assistance. 
Thus, within SECOPT there are three different models of rural road 
construction in three separate and non-coordinated project units. To 
visualize the relationships among these various approaches, we can 
imagine a continuum from strict direct administration to full 
contracting out: 
O. Direct Administration Model. Represented by the use of manual 
labor ("mano de obra"). Direct administration by SECOPT with 
maximum community involvement and maximum SECOPT involvement 
in promotion, supervision, quality control. 
o Limited Contracting Out. Represented by projects funded by 
AID. SECOPT does direct administration and contracts out only 
for machinery and equipment by private contractors. SECOPT 
also might contract some other item of work such as subbase 
materials and culverts. SECOPT fully responsible for plans, 
designs, supervision, and maintenance. 
o Full Contracting Out. Represented by projects funded by the 
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Private 
contractors involved in designs, plans, and then full 
responsibility for construction. SECOPT plays more distant 
role as development administrators. Contractors have more 
responsibility for quality of work. 
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C. Institutional Analysis 
1. Transition to Limited Contrar.ting-Out in SECOPT/AID Unit 
The General Directorate of Roads (DGC) of SECOPT has established 
project units for its different bilateral and multilateral funded 
projects. These project units function independently from each o~her 
and devise their own methods of operation. Our concern here is with the 
transition of the AID Project Unit. 
During the 1970's the SECOPT/AID Project Unit had its own tractors, 
machinery, equipment, operators, and supporting 5taff to build and 
rehabilitate rural feeder roads. This approach cut costs by involving 
in-kind community contributions for labor and digging drainages. First 
it reduced costs to the Unit. Second, it increased the community 
involvement in the construction process. Third, as a result, it made it 
possible to build more ro~ds at the same cost than the other 
approaches. 
On the other hand, there were several problems with the approach. 
First, it took from six months to a year to gain community involvement; 
a substantial amount of social promotion was required. Second, the 
machinery and equipment was in disrepair and caused delays. Spare parts 
had to be ordered through the Proveeduria, and often took as much as 
six months for approval. Then, spare parts had to be purchased in the 
United States. Once spare parts arrived it took a~other one or two 
months to get equipment repaired through government repair shops. 
Third, all small scale purchases also had to be made through the 
Proveeria, causing further delays. Fourth, the quality of work seemed 
to be inadequate. 
In addition, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the private sector 
construction firms began to pressure for changes in the construction 
system in order to allow more private participation in public sector 
civil works construction. 
In 1980, coinciding with the new AID Loan No. 035, the AID Project Unit 
of SECOPT switched fro~ direct administration to a "limited contracting 
out" approach. 
2. SECOPT/AID Contracting Out Procedures 
(a) Preliminary Assessment 
SECOPT receives requests for constructing rural roads from the National 
Development Plan of CONSUPLANE and from direct requests from different 
rural communities. SECOPT and AID are concerned with the need for 
rural roads in agricultural areas. This has prompted the construction 
of roads No. 035 and 052. The economic justification for such projects 
is that there may be economic benefits for the farmers. Once a road has 
been approved for preliminary acceptance, a SECOPT and AID engineer 
visit the site for initial inspection. They must assess the vehicle 
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traffic, pedestrian road use, and other factors. A preliminary 
topographical map is made. A second stage is the conducting of a socio-
economic study which takes roughly ~hree months. This ~urvey is 
conducted by staff of SECOPT and is used in the preparation of the 
parameters for bid procure~ents in subsequent contract bidding (13.0-
SECOPT, 1985). 
(b) Construction Design 
In the SECOPT offices, final plans and designs are made for each road 
system. These terrain maps are quite superficial and without detail, 
allowing for much variations, deviations, and on-the-spot changes. This 
ubviously has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that there 
is the fle~ibility for changes and on-the spot changes. Such 
fle~ibility reduces efficiency in equipment management and therefore 
increases construction cost and prevents adequate quality control and 
monitoring. There can be considerable politi~al pressures for changes, 
extensions, and revisions. There nave also been ~ases of contractors 
being requested to provide more services than originally plannE~. The 
final design plans take roughly two weeks to complete. 
SECOPT/AID produced an excellent construction manual for rural roads 
in August, 1985. Entitled "Manual para la Construccion de Caminos 
Rurales," it provides a good and concise overview of how SECOPT is to 
handle AID-funded rural road projects. This document covers ten basic 
chapters on the following subjects: 1) organization and responsibility; 
2) work relationships; 3) reporting and monitoring; 4) changes and 
contract modifications; 5) material control; 6) guidelines for 
preparation plans, specifications and cost estimations; 7) geometric 
design; 8) drainage design; 9) soils-materials investigation; and 10) 
construction specification (13.0- SECOPT, 1985). 
According to this manual AID has final responsibility to approve the 
design plans, documents, construction contracts, construct:on companies 
and the construction awards. Since the SECOPT has similar 
responsibility according to the Honduran law, it seems logical from the 
institutional and administration point of view that the elaboration of 
design plans, specifications and construct\on documents could be 
prepared by the private sector and be ~upervised by SECOPT and AID. 
The study team examined t~o sets of plans in the SECOPT office. The one 
was made by SECOPT (Road Project A,acualpa-Santa Maria-Dept Olancho-EI 
Paraiso 43.65 km) and the other by a consultant firm (Road Project San 
Francisco de la Paz-Gualaco 32.4 km.) The consultant plan presents a 
more comprehensive set of plans (13.A-SECOPT, 1984). 
A high quality of design plans is essential to determine accurately the 
optimum volume of construction work and to prepare the detailed unit . 
price analysis. The construction manual indicates clearly that the most 
favorable or feasible method for construction bidding is on the basis 
of a unit price unalysis rather than on the basis of partial renting of 
construction equipment based on hourly rates. 
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(c) Bidding Procedures 
SECOPT has prepared a second document, "Documentos de Precalificacion 
Reconstruccion de Caminos de Acceso," for pre-qualifying firms and for 
establishing the quality required of firms. A series of documents are 
required from contractors in order to examine qualifications including 
questionnaires, financial statements, and legal status. It is patterned 
after the AID Handbook on procedures and the AID RFPs (14.C-SECOPT, 
1986) • 
. SECOPT also provides to bidders a basic document entitled "Documentos 
de Licicacion y Contrato," that outlines bidding procedures, points 
system, and evaluation specifications for construction of rural roads. 
The bid document contains: the number of roads to be built and their 
specifications; specific work plans to be completed; specific designs; 
specifications for making offers; and specifications for bonds. There 
are four types of bonds: (1) 10.000 Lempiras guarantee at beginning 
stating that prices stated will hold for 90 day~; (2) 15X completion 
bond that is good for three oionths after construction ends; (3) lOX 
special retention bond based on estimated completed execution of the 
work; and (4) a bond for 100% amouTlt advanced by the GOH (14.D-SECOPT, 
1986). 
Contractors are requested to submit a pre-qualification statement. In 
the last round of bids, over 30 Honduran firms demonstrated interest in 
being pre-qualified; 15 were pre-qualified; and six were selected to 
build six blocks. 
Normally, rural roads are grouped in blocks. The contr~ctor may bid on 
all blocks or partial blocks. SECOPT and AID personnel take contractors 
to future construction sites to appreciate the kinds of civil works 
required. 
SECOPT produces an internal document that specifies the outline and 
specifications for the project. The last document produced was entitled 
"Reconstruccion Caminos de Acceso Proyectos Selecionados, Grupo de 
Envio, No. 10," in July, 1986 for projects in the Departments of 
Comayagua, Cortes, and Copan. The document contai~s a socio-economic 
jusiification for the project based a project versus no prOjEct 
comparison of agricultural prnduction, agricultural prices, yields, and 
other economic factors. It contains a very specific and detailed list 
of unit prices for reference, as well as specific detail Df road 
lengths, curves, culverts, drainage, and crowns. (14.E-SECOPT). The 
last project was to produce bids for the following roads: 
Comayagua Department 
Cortes Department 
Copan Department 
Totals 
55.55 km roads 
42.30 km roads 
60.00 km roads 
157.85 km roads 
2,008.295 Lemp:ras 
1,~65.584 Lempiras 
826.465 Lempiras 
4,300.344 Lempiras 
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SECOPT maintains its own internal reference unit price and overall 
estimates of the total civil work costs. In almost all cases in recent 
years the contractors have made bids below the reference price. This 
is most likely because of considerable competition for work and the 
econumic depression of the country. 
Can SECOPT get even lower prices? Conversations with SECOPT, AID, and 
contractors suggest that it is doubtful th~t lower bids can be made. 
Costs might be lowered by having contractors include more manual labor 
as a component of their construction bid, but this is uncertain. 
A recent bid procedure is illustrative of the bidding process: 
o The bid RFP was printed in the local press on June 12, 1986. 
Fifteen construction firms were pre-qualified and asked to 
submit bids. 
o Firms were askeu to bid on six blocks of rural roads. 
o Ten firms made bids. 
o The evaluation committee decides on lowest bidder. 
o Six awards were made to six different firms because each had 
bid lowest in one block but was either second or higher in 
another block. 
o Results were sent to AID for ~onfirmation and approval to 
award contracts. (14.K-SECOPT, 1986) 
It takes about six months from the bid time to contract award. The 
contractor and SECOPT are requirEd to fulfill the following tasks: 
o SECOPT writes economic proposals and prepares bid documents 
(three weeks) 
o Contrac~ bids are let and firms bid (three weeks) 
o SECOPT review panel examines bids (two weeks) 
o Contract with contractor is written (two weeks) 
o Review of contract by GOH Budget Office (4 weeks) 
o SECOPT corrections and review based on observations by the 
8udget Office (one week) 
o Review by Government General Provision Office (two wee~s) 
o Approval and signature of the President of the Republic (one 
week) 
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o Payments by Contractor of fees, legalization of contract, and 
guarantee payment of 15-20Y. (one week) 
o Contractor obtains bond from commercial bank and bond 
insurance companies (two weeks). (5.c- Republica de Honduras, 
1985i 
After these steps are compl~ted, the contractor is re~dy to begin work. 
It was estimated by SECOPT that there are over 100 steps that a 
contractor must fulfill in order to get a contract. However, most of 
these only have to be done once and are thus automatic. An example is 
registration with the College of Civil Engineers. From all available 
evidence, very few Hondur~n companies view these bureaucratic obstacles 
as a major problem. Their most serious problem is acquiring financial 
loans to cnrry out the construction. 
The contract itself is straightforward and follows standard procedures 
used by AID worldwide. A recent contract reviewed, "Contrato Gobierno 
de Honduras y Constructora Equipo de Construccion S. de R.L. de C.C." 
(ECO) of December, 1985, shows the following: 
o Contract ~as for 27.9 kms for El Espinal-Plan de Turcios-San 
Antonio de SARA in Olancho Department. 
o Contract to be completed in 210 days with 300 Lempira fine 
for each day late after that date. 
o Total contract was L806.856 fixed price contract. 
o Specific clause No. 12 whereby contractor agrees to contract 
as many people as possible from the community. (14.I-SECOPT, 
1985) 
3. Rural Road Construction 
Rural road construction is implemented by the contractors using SECOPT 
designs, plans, and specifications. SECOPT and AID engineers supervise 
quality and implementation of the civil work. Even though the 
contractor is responsible technically, the final responsibility rests 
with 3ECOPT which is directly in charge of the constru~iion and 
management and the quality control. The contractGr, in reality, is 
contracted out for rental of equipment and machinery or for utilization 
~f its equipmen~ and machinery for SECOPT. 
SECOPT normally sets up construction programs with the following 
criteria: 
O. Blocks of 20 kilometer road systems are established. 
O. Contractors are asked to bid on blocks. 
O. Contractors have blocks of roads next to each other. 
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Because of these criteria, the contractor will set-up camps along the 
roadside near construction, and normally will have its own people and 
will not use outside or community assistance for road construction. 
Contractors prefer their own experie~ced people to training and working 
with new people. The contractor will also have its own supervisory 
engineer on location. These "loyalty' procedures seem logical since the 
contractor always faces strict time and quality require~2nts. 
There have been relatively few and minor problems with contractors. It 
is estimated that there are only two contractor problems out of ten. 
Those problems are considered minor. The principal reason given is the 
continual re-assessment of pre-qualifications of potential contractors; 
the elimination of troublesome contractors; and the self-elimination of 
contractors who have had previous problems with SECOPT. Overall, tr~ 
contracting out system works smoothly. 
4. Comparisons of Three Rural Road Construction Approaches 
As stated above, there are three approaches for rural road construction 
by SECOPT in Honduras. This comparison highlights the differences, 
discusses advantages and disadvantages, and assesses efficiencies and 
effectiveness of these approaches from ~n institutional standpoint. 
(a) Assessment of Construction Needs 
Direct Administration: SECOPT Unit gets requests from rural 
communities who apply. An established list of roads is made. Requests 
are taken mainly from Choluteca area in south zone. Plan for building 
the roads is agreed upon with community action. 
Limited Contracting Out (AID): SECOPT and AID engineers use National 
Development Plan ~nd community requests. A list of sites is made. 
Plans are made well in advance according to year schedule and 
appropriate plans. 
Full Contracting Out: SECOPT gets requests from head office. Engineers 
make site visits. Yearly plan is made. 
(b) Planning and Design 
Direct Administration: Economists do brief socio-economic study of 
region to determine cost benefits of approach. Point system of 
SECOPT is used to determine the priority of the site. Engineers make 
preliminary and basic road designs. Roads are considered basic and do 
not require major technical effort. 
Limited Contracting Out: SECOPT and AID engineers and economists 
prepare a basic socio-economic s~udy and determine priorities in road 
improvement o~ the basis of SIC ratios. A road and agriculture 
inventory is carried out in the field to identify construction, 
maintenance and rehabilitation costs and the agricultural and social 
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benefit. B3sic or prelimjnary engin~ering design plans are prepared and 
mostly used to determine the needs of renting equipment on the basi5 of 
daily hourly costs. 
Full Contracting Out: El~borate a~d full technical studies conducted. 
Normally have 100 kilometer long roads. Feasibility is detailed to 
dete.mine priorities basec on the NOV, etc. Feasibility is done by 
consultants with the assistance of SECOPT. Final decisicns are made and 
include a complete specification and cost estimation and all the 
bidding documents needed to contract out the construction work. 
(c) Use of Contractors 
Direct Administration: No contractors used. All manual labor from the 
community. 
Limited Contracting Out: Use 12-20 different contract firms in 
competitive bidding. Contractors used for equipment and limited 
construction work items such as subbase culverts, etc. Management and 
supervision is under the responsibility of SECOPT/AIU. 
Full Contracting Out: Use 5-10 construction firms in competitive 
bidding. Construction, management and responsibility to fulfill the 
design requirements are by the contractor only. Supervision, reporting 
and monitoring during construction are carried out by contracted 
consultants, individuals, or companies. 
(d) Quality 
Direct Administration: Quality is "as good as it has to be." Belief 
that community roads are mainly for few vehicles and do not 
require sophisticated quality. 
Limited Contracting Out: Excellent quality and performance by 
contractors to get medium-level roads. 
Full Contracting Out: Excellent upgraded quality. Require high 
technical quality. Believe that upgraded roads will require less 
maintenance and therefore longer lifetime. In other words, by cutting 
maintenance costs and reducing vehicle operation, costs due to better 
road conditions will minimize the total transportation cost during the 
entire lifetime of the road. 
(e) Administration 
Direct Administration: Has 30 personnel with 15 professionals and 15 
support staff. All personnel in Teguigalpa. Use own vehicles to 
go to two road sites of Santa Barbara Department and r.holuteca. 
Limited Contracting Out: Has 150 personnel with 40 technical and the 
rest supporting staff. Some of staff decentralized in San Pedro Sula 
and in department capitals where they are carrying out road 
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construction. 
Full Contracting Out: Two diff~rent·and independent staffs. Both 
have over 100 personnel with 30-40% ·professional and rest supporting 
staff. High degree of personnel in department capitals. 
Clearly, the Direct Administration approach utilizing manual labor from 
the ~ommunity is distinct from the other two models. It uses food for 
work, pays workers directly daily for labor on the roads, has its own 
machinery, and is perhaps the most grassroot approach to ro~d 
construction. Its style contrasts distinctively from the AID and 
IDB/World Bank model of contracting out. 
D. Economic Analysis 
1. General 
Accurate economic cost analysis of a rural road should cover all the 
transportation expenditures related to the road. In other words, any 
cost comparison should include construction, maintenance, 
rehabilitation and user economic expenditure costs during the service 
life time of the road. Usually the life time period of a rural road is 
15 to 20 years. By determining the total cost of any given traffic 
volume one can determine the least cost road alternative. If this 
information were available one could determine what should be the most 
efficient and least cost rural road administration in Honduras. 
Since the economic cost information of the Honduran rural 
transportation is not available, cost comparisons can be done by 
compari~on of construction quality and cost together. Cost comparisons 
ar~ mdde among the following three alternative road construction 
approaches: 
o SECOPT/ Manual Labor intensive labor by direct 
administration 
o AID/SECOPT limited contracting out 
o IDB/SECOPT full contracting out 
2. Expenditure Disbursement and Project Modification of SECOPT/AID 
Project 
The SECOPT/AID Rural Road construction agreement was signed on January 
22, 1980 and was planned for four years (1980-1983). AID provided 
$10,970,000 in loan funds (40 years, 10 year grace period, 2 % interest 
for first 10 years, 3 X interest per annum thereafter) and $230,000 in 
grants to finunce the reconstruction of 650 kilometers of rural access 
roads and 250 kilometers of rural trails in the western region of 
Honduras. Combined with GOH contributions, the total program 
expenditures amounted to $14,950,000. Table IV-1 shows the details of 
the program expenditures. (C.14- AID, 1980) 
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It was determined that a new institutional delivery system of 
contracting out to private firms would be used. Access roads were to be 
reconstructed according to GOH national standards and thereafter 
maintained by the Directorate General of Maintenance. 
Table IV-2 shows that the access roads were to be reconstructed with 
capital intensive technological methods and rural trails were planned 
to be labor intensive in construction. This program was modified during 
the project period. 
Table IV-3 shows how various amendments increased the financing for 
this program by AID to $41,900,000 in loans and $960,000 in grants. 
Combined with GOH contributions, the total financing 07 the program 
reached to $57,000,000. 
In addition, the total number of kilometers of rural roads and trails 
to be reconstructed was increased from 900 to 1,510 and the program was 
extended for another three years. Expected completion date is the end 
of 1986. Thus, AID financing increased by 300 ~, rural roads to be 
reconstructed was augmented by 68 ~, and 75 X more time was required to 
complete the program than was initially planned. 
In addition to the increased program goal of 610 kilometers, it was 
necessary to increase assistance and time because the program was 
altered so as to exclude labor intensive reconstruction of rural 
trails. According to AID/Honduras engineers, all roads were 
reconstructed according to the specifications and designs originally 
programmed for access roads only. As seen in Table IV-2, access roads 
were estimated to be twice as expensive to reconstruct as rural trails 
and this estimate was v~ry close to the actual construction costs 
during the years 1982-1985. 
3. Comparative Ass~5sment of Contracting Out and Direct 
Administration of Rehabilitated Roads 
It was not possible to compare the costs of different AID-funded 
projects because the rural road reconstruction under the AID program 
used contracting out and because the rural trails dimension of the 
program was dropped. Consequently, it was necessary to compare AID 
contracting out of rural road construction with SEC OPT (IDE) direct 
admini~tration reconstruction of rural roads. The latter utilized a 
manual labor/labor intensive approach and is similar to that originally 
intended by AID for the reconstruction of rural trails. 
The direct administration method of SECOPT/Manual Labor uses community 
labor and pay5 them the minimum a;ricultural wage. Roads are designed, 
supervised, and constructed by community members with SECOPT engineers. 
Little heavy equipment is used and materials are purchased from the 
Proveeduria. Because the communities must be organized for this work, 
because it is labor intensive, and because it uses the slow method for 
material purchases through the Proveeduria, this direct administration 
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reconstruction approach to rural roads is slow. 
SECOPT/Manual Labor constructed new 'roads and reconstructed existing 
rural roads. For purposes of comparfson, the reconstruction road costs 
were used. The reconstruction average cost was L23,808 for SECOPT 
projects during the years 1982-1985. This SECOPT direct administration 
rural road program was also much smaller than the AID program used in 
the comparison. (13.J- SECOPT, 1986) 
The SECOPT/AID contracting out program of rural road construction (522-
0164), in contrast, uses no community labor and is capital intensive. 
Table IV-4 below, shows that for the SECOPT/Manual Labor program labor 
costs constituted 73X and equipment cost (depreciation) 5 to 8 X of 
total project costs. (13.J-SECOPT',1986) In comparison, the AID 
contracting out program labor costs were only 19 perc~nt and equipment 
costs were 63X of total project costs incurred in rural road 
reconstruction during the years 1982-1985. (14.J-SECOPT, 1986) 
Table IV-4 shows that the SECOPT/ID8 direct administration rural road 
reconstruction cost per kilometer for the years 1982-1985 was slightly 
(although perhars not significantly) less than that of AID's 
contracting-out cost for the same period---L23,808 versus L26,892. 
Advantages of contracting out lie in economies of equipment use, 
procur~ment of materials, and time, while advantages of direct 
administration are economies of labor, non-profit production, and 
equipment use. These advantages appear to result in fairly comparable 
overall costs. The cust comparison data indicate that AID contracting 
out to private firms of road reconstruction reduced the time, but was 
slightly more costly. Moreover, more AID financial assistance in 
foreign currency loans was needed to accomplish the task. On the 
macroeconomic level, this may have aggravated the persistent balance of 
payments problem. 
4. Assessment of AID/SECOPT Construction Bids 
Table IV-5 provides information on six recent AID-funded rural 
road projects. The table summarizes the basic engineering and cost 
information of these six projects: 1) project location, 2) contractor, 
3) number of bidders, 4) length of each road, 5) the lowest bidder 
price, 6) government estimated cost, 7) minimum bidding cost per 
kilometer, 8) the ratio of the maximum to the mini~um bidder price, and 
9) the ratio between the second low bid price to the lowest or minimum 
bidding cost. 
According to Table IV-5, in five of si~ projects the government 
estimates were about 10-15 'l. more than the contractors bidding prices. 
It also indicates that the ratio between the highest bidding cost to 
the low~st one varies between 1.18 to 1.46. Th~ data indicate that the 
difference between the upper limit and the lower limit bidding price is 
only 18 to 46 per~~nt. The difference between the second lowest bid and 
the lowest bid is only one to eight percent. Only in Project No.5 is 
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the difference larger, at 11~. It appears that there is a spirit of 
competition among the contractors. However, we find it unusual that in 
these six projects a different contractor provided the low bid, so that 
in no case was the winner of one bid. the low bid in another project. It 
is possible that a more careful analysis of thes~ six projects would 
explain the rather tidy distribution of projects to contractors. 
Table IV-5 also indicates that the total construction cost of a 
SECOPT/AID rural road varies mainly between L28,000 to L38,000 per 
kilometer. Only in project No.3 was cost per kilometer significantly 
lower, at about L13,000/kilometer. It seems that the improvenlent needs 
for this rural road project are minimal. 
5. Cost Comparisons Between Direct Administration and Contracting 
Out of Road Construction 
The direct administration rur~l road ~onstruction approach uses 
concentrated manual labor to build roads. These roads are designed for 
a travelling speed of 20, 30, and 40 kilometers/hour for mountainous, 
hilly, and level terrain respectively. The maximum longitudinal grade 
varies between 6Y. and 101. for a design speed of 40 kilometers/hour and 
9X to 121. for design speed Df 20 kilom~ters/hour. According to 
SECOPT/Manual Labor Unit documents (13.J- SECOPT, 1986) the road width 
is 4.5 meters. These ro~ds are all weather roads. 
The direct administration approach has two different groups of roads in 
their reports. (13.J- SECOPT, 1906) The first group includes 17 roads 
with a total length of 65,5 kilometers. The total construction cost was 
L2,995,089. Thus the construction cost was L45,726/kilnmeter. The 
second group includes 136.3 kilometers and its total construction cost 
was L3,579,823, or L26,264/kilometer. 
The average construction cost of all 65.5 kilometers and 136.3 
kilometers of road'- is L32,581/kilometer. This average cost per 
kilometer is very similar to cost per kilometer of rur~l roads 
constructed under the AID/SECOPT program. (See Table IV-5) 
It seems that the unit cost of construction for a low standard rural 
road by direct administration (manual labor and labor intensive) and 
that of limited contracting out (AID) is similar and according to the 
same construction records is about L30~000 to L35,OOO/kilometer. 
However, these costs do not include administration, supervision, and 
other general overhead expenditures. 
In order to compare limited contracting out, and full contracting out, 
one needs to compare both costs and product quality. The most 
expeditious way to compare is to conduct an analysis of unit prices 
of road projects carried out by different contracting methods. 
Table IV-6 compares the unit price of work item in AID and IDB/IBRD 
road projects. The projects flnanced by AID/SECOPT w~re done by limited 
contracting out. Projects financed by the IDB/IBRD were contracted out 
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to national contractors. The cost data from one lOB financed road 
projec~ is related to unpaved rural roads. The otl,;r lOB financed 
project and the lBRD financed road project are asphalt secondary roads 
and a major highway, respectively •. 
Table lV-6 indicates that the unit prices of the lOB-funded rural road 
is equal to or less than to the unit prices of the AID rural road 
projects. It appears that contracting out will generate lower unit 
rrices and it is clear that construction by administration with limited 
contracting out reduces the price of a given and specified work item. 
Contracted out unit prices for principal work items are similar in all 
syste~s. But in the direct administration and limited contracting out 
approaches there are other costs that do not eyist in the full 
contracting out procedures used by the IDB/lBRD approach. These 
additional expenditures include 1) project management and 
administration, 2) contractor surervision, and 3) quality control. 
According to SECOPT documents this expenditure might be in the ran~e of 
15 %. (13.J-SECOPT, 1986) 
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TABLE IV-l 
PROJECTIONS OF PLANNED EXPENDITURES 
BY PROJECT YEAR 
(US $(00) 
SOURCE PROJECT YEAR 
1 2 3 TOTALS 
ConstrLlc t ion 1,419 3,502 3,929 8,850 
Maintenance 750 o 0 750 
Evaluation 50 50 50 150 
TOTAL AID 2,219 3,552 3,979 9,750 
Construction 823 818 815 2,456 
Maintenance 214 142 465 821 
TOTAL GOH 1~037 960 1,280 3,277 
TOTAL ~3~,2~5~6~ _____ 4~,~5~1~2~~5~·,~2~5~9 __ ~1~3~,0~2~7 
Inflation/Contingencies 74 538 1,311 1,923 
( 10 % ) 
GRAND TOTAL 3~,3~3~0~ ____ ~5~,~05~0~-=6~,5~7~0~~1~4.,9~5~0 
_______________________________ •• N _______ • __________________________ _ 
Source: Agency for International Development, "Project Paper, Rural 
Trails and Access Roads, 522-016~1" 1980. 
Labor 
Materie.l 
Equipment 
TOTAL 
Kilometers 
SourcE:;>s: 
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TABLE IV-2 
CONTRACTING OUT CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF RURAL ROADS: 
PLANNED AS COMPARED WITH. ACTUAL COSTS, 1982-85 
(cost per km) 
PLAr~NE:D 11 ACTUAL 21 
ACCESS ROADS RURAL TRAILS ACCESS ROADS 
( Lem.) (Lem) ( Lem) 
5,007 22 6,509 61 5,147 
1,350 6 1,070 10 1,404 
16,142 72 3,07C 29 16,845 
22,499 100 10,649 100 23,396 
to'50 250 1,050 
22 
6 
72 
100 
(1) AID, "Project Paper, Rural Trails and Access Roads( 522-035 and 
522-0164," January 22,1980. 
(2) SECOPT,"Informe de Avance Construccio'n y mejoramiento Caminos 
Vecinales y de acceso," February 28,1986. 
Notes: 
(1) Some cost breakdown assumed to prevail as planned for access roads 
in project paper. 
(2) Project originally plann~d for 900 kilometers of reconstructed 
roads and trails, 650 kilometers of access r~,ds at a planned cost 
of L2,4c9 and 250 kilometers of "ural trails at a planned cost of 
LI0,649. V~yious amendments since 1980 increased AID financing by 
approximately 300 Yo and planned road reconstruction from 900 
kilometers to 1,510 kilometers, or by 68 percent. 
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TABLE IV-3 
PROGRAM OF RURAL ROADS·PROJECTS SECOPT/AID 
(uS ".) 
DESCRIPT~ON 
A. Construction 
Rural Roads 
Vehicle, equipment, 
tools 
Administration 
(.ccess roads 
Bridge Rio Higuito 
B.Maintenance 
Equipment r~pair 
Road maintenance 
C. Evaluation 
Project Evaluation 
D. Bias 
E. Contingencies 
TOTALS 
GRANT 
184,000 
696,000 
2C,000 
60,000 
960,000 
AID GOH TOTAL 
36,410,000 8,266,000 44,676,000 
800,000 
480,000 
2,000,000 
600,000 
166,000 
664,000 
2,696,000 
600,000 
966,000 
1,590,000 386,000 1,976,000 
-------- 1,256,000 1,256,000 
300,000 ------- 300,000 
------- 20,000 
2,840,000 946,000 3,846,000 
41,940,000 14,100,000 57,000,000 
, 
Source: SECOPT, ~Contenido Informe de avance construc~ion y 
mejoramiento caminos vecinales y de acceso, AID 522-035," February 
28,1986. 
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TABLE IV-4 
RECONSTRUCTION COSTS PER KILOMETER OF RURAL ROADS: 
SECOPT DIRECT AOMINISTRATION AND, AID CONTRACTING OUT,1982-1985 
SECOPT(BID) 
DIRECT ADMINISTRATION (3) 
Lempiras Percent::lge 
DIRECT COSTS 
Labor 17,381 73 
Material 714 3 
Equipment 1,190 5 
Other 714 3 
AID LIMITED 
CONTRACTING OUT (1) 
Lempiras Percentages 
5,109 19 
1,345 5 
16,942 b3 
___ 0 _____________________________________ 
Sub-Total 19,999 
INDIRECT COSTS 
Supervision, 
Evaluation, and 
~dministration 3,095 
Other 714 
Sub-Total 3,809 
TOTAL 23,808 
Sources: 
84 23,396 87 
13 1,614 6 
3 1,882 7 
16 3,496 13 
100 26,892 100 
(1) SECOPT, "Contenido Informe de avance construccinn y mejoramiento 
caminos vecin~le5 y de acceso AID 522-035, "February, 1986. ( For 
years 1982-1985.) 
(2) SECOPT, "M~todo para la integraci&n de precios unitarios y 
programacion de caminos a construirse por mana de obra," undated, 
cerca,1984.By Jose Monzon. 
(3) SECOPT,"Informe final, sub-programa: Caminos por mana de Dbra," 
June, 1986. ( For years 1982-1985. Data for reconstructed roads 
only. 
TAI!-!- IV-:51 
ANALYSIS OF SECOPT-AID 
---------
PRO- ROAD IWIE LENGTH lOWER BID- GOVERrlr!ENT til NI IU1 
JECT CI(I'I5I DIHG PRICE ESTlMTED BIDDING 
N). CLE/'I>IRASI COSTS CLPSI COST PER 
LPS/KI1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1. 
2. 
3. 
It. 
:5. 
6. 
S.n hldro-
La Gu ••• 
8no •• Air •• y Acc. 
Slvu.totp~u.-
CustlrC., AQu. 
OulcR. Lo. T.b.loco. 
t.rro Bl.nco 
Florld.-El P.raC.o 
L •• Flor •• -NY •• 
E.p.r.nz ••• tc. 
1.'""(,, ~ Cu.tec.-
l1c-aab.r 
~v(o • CustKA-
St •• Cruz d. Dulc. 
y AcCHD. 
S.n Isidro-St •• 
Cruz d. YOJo. 
• R~.b'lltetlon only 
SourC.1 
22.7 732,:52" B:51,:519 32,313 
17.1>:5 678018 .. 731.6 .. 8 38."2" 
60.0 79".1>:53 926.46:5 13.2 .... • 
21.3 602.68 .. 6 .. 0.41:5 2B.2'J5 
16.3 :563.921 636.202 3".:590 
19.6 32,"60 
SECOPT. "R •• ult.do. d. la Evaluaclon d. Contrato •• " July. 1986. 
COISTRUCTION BIDS 
RATIDI RATlol NO. OF AWARDED PROJECT 
MI. BID 2ND LOW BIDDERS CONTRACTDR NO. 
ffiltt .M2 HAlE 
"IN. BID 1ST LOW 
PRICE BID 
2ND LOW 
!III! El!1~ 
1ST LQI.l 
BID PRICE 
-----------------
1 ..... 1.078 '1 Dr.V·doll 1. 
.t 411. 
1.18 1.01 B CONT£C 2. 
1.31 1.01 PRODECDN 3. 
0'1 
\0 
1.3:5 1.03 7 P.vl ..... to. It. 
de Hondur •• 
1.29 1.11 6 DIItATRAC :5. 
1."6 1.07 AY3C CORDCV~ 6. 
WORK ITEM 
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TABLE IV-6 
COMPARISON OF UNIT PRICE/TOTAL COST 
FOR EACH REFERENCE PROJECT 
(LEMPIRAS) .. 
AID AID AID IDB IBRD 
RURAL*l RURAL* RURAL* RURAL ASPHALT 
UNPAVEDeUNPAVED~UNPAVED4ROADS~ 
IDB 
HIGHWAYS 
~\SPHAL T **b 
---------------------------------------------------------------------Cleari ng/Tree 
Roots (hectares) 
Clearing(hectares) 750-800 
Sub-bc.se (m S ) 
Concrete Class A(mS ) 500 
Concrete Class B(m3) 360 
Crushed Rock (m3) 210-500 
T.C.R. 24" ( mI> 210 
T.C.R. 30" (mI> 275 
T.C.R. 36" (mI> 345-350 
Structural 
Excavation 47 
* Limited contracting-out 
** Full contracting-out 
SOllrces: 
800 1,800 
800 700 
19 
350 350 
185-200 210 148 184 
200 210 144 158-178 
250 180 190-210 
335 275 117-256 
36 150 
(1) SECOPT, "Reconstrucci6n de Camino5 de Acceso-Proyecto5 
Seleccionados," Grupo de Envio No. 10, July 15, 1986. 
1,600 
24 
495 
300 
225 
150 
190 
260 
(2) SECOPT, "Proyectos Seleccionados Tomando en Cuenta las 
Condiciones Soc.io-econ~micas y del Media Ambiente," Grupo de 
Envio, No.9, 1985. 
(3) SECOPT, Informe de Avance Construcci~n y Mejoramiento Caminos 
Vecinales y de Acceso," February, 1986. 
(4) SEC OPT , "Informe Final: Supervisi5n de Construcci6n Camino 
Vecinal: Valle de Lomas, Cataguacha, y Orito- EI Desv(o y Camino 
de Acceso y el Desvio Hacienda Vieja," Consultores CONASH, April, 
1985. 
(5) SECOPT, "Informe Final- Supervi5i~n de Construcci6n de Carreteras 
y Puentes, Proyecto Danli- Santa Maria," 1984. 
(6) SECOPT, " Informe Final de la Construccitn de Proyecto Carretera 
Sonaguera Km. 35," November, 1985. 
CHAPTER 5 
CONTRACTING OUT: THEORY AND HONDURAN REALITY 
In this chapter, the major features of contracting out in Honduras are 
summarized. In doing so we are particularly interp.sted in 
unde~standing the Honduran reality of contracting out. This reality is 
then contrasted to commonly believ.:!d theses as to the effects of 
contracting out more generally. 
A. Contractors as Producers 
Contractors in Honduras are considered producers of goods and services 
but not as innovators or creators. Their role is to produce what the 
central government dictates. Very few contractors are engaged in 
creating new products but rather follow the instructions, plans, and 
designs that are made by the government offices. 
In Honduras bids are specific in stating the kinds and types of 
services or goods required. Potential contractors are normally 
requested to submit only economic bids based on referenced unitary 
prices established by :he central government. The bids are 
straightforward and the lowest bidder wins the contract. 
Once contracts are awarded, contractors are expected to work under the 
close supervision of the central government supervisors and inspectors. 
At the termination of public works cc.ntractors are paid, released, and 
their obligation terminates. There is little room for contractors to 
bring about technological or managerial changes. 
B. Private Sector Employment Generation 
Construction projects have assisted considerably the construction 
industry to create at least 20,000 new jobs per year. This calculation 
is based on the projects looked at in this study and is at best an 
estimate. These are either directly in the AID-funded projects or 
through the projects that must be terminated on a self-help basis. 
There is a ripple effect also in that indirect employment generation 
will take place a5 contractors purchase materials and supplies for 
construction. 
AID lean money itself is enough to create new jobs. It is estimated 
that there are 45,000 normal construction employment jobs in Honduras. 
Loan funds are assisting in creating another ~O,OOO jobs. 
It should be noted, however, that AID-funded construction projects in 
rural roads are machine intensive. If a shift to labor intensive 
construction were to take place, it would be possible to create even 
more jobs. In both housing and education projects, the appropriate 
technology is labor intensive. !n the rural roads project it would be 
possible to create at least another 900 jobs (45 people per road 
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prOject X 20 projects) by using more manual labor approaches. 
Construction jobs have strong forward and backward linkages with 
employment in other sectors. As the Project Paper for Shelter for the 
Urban Poor II, Loan No. 522-HG-008, points out, the multiplier effect 
of a construction project can range from 3.12 to as high as 6.67 times 
the initial capital investment. A conservative estimate, therefore, is 
that the three sectors ~ill generate a long-run total investment in 
Honduras of over $150 million. (11.G- AID, 1985) 
A positive effect on these three sectors, therefore, is that the 
construction firms do hire new people. In the 60 firms reviewed in the 
construction firm study, it was noted that there is always a core staff 
but that the firm hired piecemeal labor for construction jobs. (5.M-
Lardizabal, 1986) 
C. Contracting Out Theses Versus Honduran Reality 
The major purpose fOT contracting out is to reduce costs and to improve 
quality for the government. The thesis is that the private sector is 
able to deliver goods and services at a lower cost than government 
agencies. There are a host of arguments in the contracting out 
literature to substantiate that this should be the case. However, not 
all of the principal theses stated in the literature hold for Honduras. 
We will state the general theses of contracting out as described in the 
literature and then describe its application to Honduras. The general 
theses all relate to cost considerations, but for conceptual 
convenience they can be discussed under three major categories. 
Several theses deal with institutional issues of contracting out. 
Thesis 1: Private firms can avoid bureaucratic problems inherent 
in local government. 
Situation: Private sector has fewer bureaucratic problems than public 
sector, but it takes 6 months for contract award and thus the 
private sector must deal with bureaucracy as well. 
Thesis 2: Contracting out produces better management. 
Situation: Although the government suffers from inefficiencies, 
underutilization of personnel, and lack of productivity, the 
private sector is not as competent in management skills as 
one might expect. 
Thesis 3: The government gives up some direct control of the process of 
providing good~ and services. 
Situation: The government maintains fairly strict control over 
contractors, primarily through bureaucratic oversight, and 
therefore the level of direct control remains almost the 
same. 
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Thesis 4: Contracting out permits gre~,er flexibility than direct 
administration in adjusting program size and organizational 
structure. 
Situation: This thesis has reasonable support because it is more 
difficult to change the personnel structure in the 
government. Further, government tends to be highly 
centralized and inflexible. 
Thesis 5: There will be resistance by the public sector to contracting 
out because of employee pressure and fears of decliners in 
service quality. 
Situation: Public employees defend their long term employment security 
which leads to resistance. But, in those cases where 
contracting out is a well-established practice, there is 
little resistance because more contracting means fewer 
responsibilities. 
Thesis 6: Contracting out limits the growth of government. 
Situation: Because the public sector is viewed as employer of last 
resort and because of public employee resistance, the size of 
government has not been reduced. 
Thesis 7: Contracting out may affect locational distribution of 
services negatively because contractors provide services 
without attention to the "public" need. 
Situation: In general, the location of construction in these ~ectors is 
dictated by government. An exception was the housing project 
No. 007, in which the developer built housing on his land 
without consideration for the locational needs of low-income 
population. 
Thesis 8: Private contracting increases the possibility of 
service disruption. 
Situation: There are several cases in housing and rural roads of 
contractors not finishing projects, perhaps up to 10 % of 
total construction. 
The following theses are concerned with technological issues. 
Thesis 9: With contracting out, the priv~te sector i~ motivated to 
explore, experiment, and develop ~=w ~echnologies. 
Situation: Public sector sets parameters for technology and does not 
encourage new procedures. There is little incentive to bring 
in innovation. 
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The last set of theses relates to economic aspects--cost and 
efficiency--of contracting out. 
Thesis 10: Private sector has more fncentive to keep costs down with 
competition. 
Situation: There are reference prices, limited competition, and thus 
only a limited degree of incentive to keep costs down. 
Thesis 11: Private firms may have lower employee compensation costs. 
Situation: Employee compensation costs about the same for public and 
private sector. Also, Honduran law requires payment of the 
13th month salary for both public and private workers. 
Thesis 12: Contracting out will reduce the cost of providing goods and 
services financed through the public sector. As a result, 
consumers will benefit from lower prices. 
Situation: The cost of construction is not substantially different 
because of the difficulties in reducing the size of the 
public sector, the use of reference prices, limited 
competition, and a lack of incentives for innovation. 
D. Use of Fees to Adjust Demand 
There is a rationale in contracting out that persons who receive 
a particular service should pay for it in accordance with use. (2.H-
Hatry, 1983, p. 85 ) People will consider the services cost to them and 
adjust their demand for the service in proportion to the value they set 
on that service. 
In Honduras, there are overriding contradictions of this thesis; in 
certain sectors there are high payments by citizens for services, while 
in other sectors nothing at all. In general, citizens are net inclined 
to pay for servi~es when they can be obtained without fees. The free 
rider problem is evident in a number of areas. Yet, the application of 
user fees more generally may both contribute to economic efficiency and 
cost recovery. 
Examples from our study show that: 
Housing: Good example of citizens paying fees for services for new 
housing. There is considerable reluctance to pay betterment costs 
entailed in reassessed land values in urban upgrading projects. 
Education: A rural community pays $7,000 average and a rural family 
pays $300 per family average for a new school constructed in the self-
help approach. 
Rural Roads: There is no fee for road usage by farmers either 
directly or indirectly. Vehicle owners and transportation users will 
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pay proportions based on usage through gasoline ~QX. Buses charge fares 
to customers. Usually the increase in transportation costs is passed 
directly to the farmers by the vehi~le owners. 
There is not enough information available to go beyond these initial 
observations. It is hard to assess, for example, whether the 
introduction of fees and charges would lead to reduced costs to the 
government and citizens. In Honduras, it appears that it is easier to 
increase fees than to raise or collect general taxes. Since these fees 
are normally based on actual costs, the increa~ed fees are easier to 
justify to the public. The kinds of fees most commonly used are: 
o Licensing fees for professionals, vendors, or contractors 
o Airport tax for travelers to pay for airports 
o Gasoline tax for road users 
o Registration fees for vehicles 
Our rationale for addressing user fees is to explore means for offering 
services and to justify long range sustainable projects that recover 
costs. There is no doubt, for example, that in eduLation contracting 
out incurs a more direct cost expenditure to the central government. 
One Cdn justify the use of the self-help approach in order to charge 
citizen-consumers for services and goods for which they would otherwise 
not be charged directly. Our concern, however, is that there be equal 
sharing of responsibility among all users. 
E. Alleviating Bottlenecks in Procurement of Production and Goods 
There are two bottlenecks facing both contracting out and direct 
administration of public work projects. And there are no planned 
actions by the central government to alleviate them. They are: 
1. Purchase of materials and supplies through the central 
governments' National Prr.curement Office (Proveeduria> 
2. Legal procedures required to award contracts 
Both procedures take about six months and cost energy, time, and 
resources. 80th require serious reflection by the central government 
regarding its role in fostering development and providing adequate 
goods and services in the most cost effective manner. 
There is no doubt that checks and balances are required by the central 
government in utilizing public funds. Citizens deserve 
to have t'leir government respond properly and adequately in procuring 
production and goods. Nevertheless, there seems to be a 
balance that must be struck between adequate controls and the equally 
important need to provide timely services. We were not able to 
calculate in terms of cost what these present procedures are, but it is 
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clear from our observations and assessment that those costs are 
considerable. 
This issue indicates a need for policy dialogue among central 
government officials and international donors, Administrative reform 
may not be enough to make slow and m~asurable reforms. Present 
procedures are not effective for successful implementation of prOject5. 
F. Expectations Versus Performance; An Economic Perspective 
Contracting out of publicly financed goods and services can take many 
forms. In a mixed (pluralistic) system like that of Honduras, few such 
goods and services have ever been delivered entirely by either the 
public sector or the private sector exclusively. Between these two 
extremes on a continuum lies contracting out as seen below: 
Public 
Sector 
ryelivery 
Contracting Out 
(Public and Private Sector) 
< > 
Private 
Sector 
Delivery 
This fundamental point is often misunderstood: contracting out is 
neither private nor public but a combination of both. Therefore, when 
we refer to a change in institutional arrangements, we refer to a 
change in degree but not in kind. More specifically, in the case of 
Honduras and this ~tudy, we are referring to an increase in contracting 
out of goods and services financed by the public sector--a move toward 
more private sector delivery. 
What can reasonably be expected when publicly financed goods and 
services are shifted more toward private sector delivery? To begin 
with, there will be certain transition costs associated with every 
institutional change -- the greater the change, the greater the cost; 
the more often the change, the more often the costs are incurred. This 
is one unambiguous cost which is typically ignored, most probably 
because it is difficult to measure. 
Many of the expected benefits from major institutional change require a 
time period sufficient for new institutional learning to occur, as well 
as time to correct institutional and administrative inconsistencies. 
Impatience with this process as well as a negat.ive reaction to the 
transition costs often forces decision makers to change the 
institutional arrangements again and again. Consequently, th~ long run 
benefits are not realized immediately while the short ,un transition 
costs continue or increase visibly. In Honduras, there appears to be a 
significant amount of experimentation with institutional changes in 
contracting out of publicly 1inanced assistance giving rise to cost 
overruns and delays. 
Another hidden cost associated with the move from self help to more 
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contracting cut to the private sector is opportunity cost. In most 
dev~loping countries such as Honduras, there exists high 
undere~ployment in many sectors such as agriculture and industry. If 
alternative productive employment is not available to the marginal 
population and if political considerations prevent mass redundancies of 
public bureaucrats, the opportunity cost of employing these people is 
zero. More contracting out to the private sector should take these 
costs into consideration even though they may not enter in the 
calculations of cost-benefit, efficiency, or other proj~ct 
measurements. 
Theoretically, it is usually assumed that people who do not work will 
not be employed and that people will not work unless they are paid 
wages. In Honduras, the marginal poor often volunteer their labor for 
rural school and road construction and the number of public employees 
is not reduced in proportion to decreased public sector activity. 
Contracting out often requires additional government monitoring and 
supervision of the private expenditure of public funds. All too often, 
this results in duplication of work in proj~ct implementation. This 
reduces the expected efficiency of contracting out, discourages the 
shrinkage of the public sector (cost, employment, and deficits), and 
mitigates against the expansion of the private sector. Such a 
duplication is unavoidable with contracting out since public money 
cannot be expended wiehout public centrol. In the last analysis, the 
loans are public debt and therefore public responsibility. 
This brings us to perhaps the most controversial issue of all; the 
relative efficiency of public production, private economic activities, 
and the performance of the hybrid contracting-out delivery system. It 
is unclear whether one particular approach is more efficient in terms 
of maximizing output at a given cost or minimizing costs for a given 
output. When all costs are considered and included, the public sector 
production should be less costly since profits are not required and 
lower taxes are paid by public enterprises. But, public enterprises 
are often monopoly producers where the primary objective is neither 
least cost, maximum output, nor economic profit. Because of political 
and administrative factors, economic efficiency may be even less 
achievable. When this reality is taken into consideration and all costs 
correctly calculated, public producers in Honduras and elsewhere 
typically do not turn out to be the efficient producer's they 
theor~tically could be. 
Private producers, while theoretically disadvantaged, are often more 
competitive than their public counterparts and have more flexibility in 
management, procurement, and production. All these are conducive to 
efficiency and are the basis for the assertion that privnte sector 
production is superior to public production. However, to the extent 
that private firms are not competitive producers, their efficiency is 
reduced in the same way that the efficiency of public enterprises is 
impaired by monopoly and bureaucracy. 
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What significance do all these have for our study of contracting out of 
publicly financed goods to private contractors in HondurNs? To 
reiterate, contracting out is neither private nor public but a hybrid 
of both. In addition, the public sector in Honduras is not a 
monopolistic producer of urban housing, rural roads or rural schools. 
Nor is the private construction industry as competitive as theory would 
require for maximum efficiency. This makes contracting out, by 
definition, neither as efficient as private production under ideal 
conditions nor as inefficient as public production under the worst 
scenario of a monopoly situation referred to above. PUT'ists may find 
this conclusion disconcerting si~ce they seek absolute, indisputable 
conclusions on efficiency one way or another. Unfortunately, black and 
white, efficient and inefficient conclusions will not be forthcoming 
from studies of contracting out in Honduras or elsewhere under these 
circumstances. All inefficiencies encount~red in the public sector 
should not be viewed as inherent to the institutional arrangement, nor 
should all efficiencies revealed in private production be considered natural. 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study assessed the effect of contracting out on quality, time, and 
C03t of construction activi~ies in Honduras. The study was conducted in 
the three sectors: shelter and urban upgrading, rural primary school 
construction, and rur~l roads. This ch~pter presents a summary of the 
findings, policy recommendations, and suggestions for future study. 
A. Contracting Out Environment 
o The 1985 Contracting Law of Honduras provides an ample and positive 
lehicle for potelltially stable and reasonable relationships between the 
~ublic sector and private sector contractors. 
o While the central government controls most funds for civil works, the 
importance of foreign bilateral and multilateral fun~s cannot be 
underestimated. The construction industry, therefore, is highly 
dependent on central government and international donor funds and 
projects for survival. 
o Contracting out is viewed as the provIsion of services--in this case, 
construction--by the private sector for government programs rather than 
the turning over to the private 3ector of responsibility, 
services, and decision making. 
o There appears to be a strong preference among government personnel 
for t~e maintenance of control over the entire project cycle of 
planning, execution, and cperation and maintenance. 
o However, the environment for increased contracting-out activity is 
favojOable. Honduran contractor flrms are adequate for providing 
government services. There is a reasonable degree of competition and 
the government is able to negotiate fair and reasonable prices for 
contracted services. 
o Relatior:ships between contractors and government agencies are good 
with some minimal problems and defaults. Bid procedures work relatively 
smoothly, but certain bureaucratic delays are noted. One major 
bottleneck is the delay between the bid time and contract award. This 
problem lies squarely with the government. A comprehensive and well 
completed design document prepared by the government will reduce 
significantly inefficiencies and unnecessary conflicts between the 
government and the contractors. 
o Major problems for contractors are 1) guarantee bonds, 2) 
considerable delay in payments, and 3) legal and bureaucratic paperwork 
and approvals. 
o There is little government control over potential collusion by 
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private contractors in the bidding process. Even though the central 
government accepts the low2st bid it is possible for contr'actors to 
act in concert in the decision as to which contractor will take the 
~ontract for different blocks of ro~ds, schools, or houses. There is 
some preliminary evidence th-it this may be happening in all three 
sectors. 
o The reference price established by government institutions based on 
the u~it r.osts of inputs is the only indicator and determinant for 
IOl'Je!Jt cost bids. It is based on specifications only and not 
performance. 
8. Effect!; of Contra~',.£~ing Out. on Public Service Delivery 
o The use of contracting out in Honduras does not strictly accord with 
some of the traditicnal contracting out theses because of 1) a hi~h 
degree of centraliz~tion that is traditional in Latin America and which 
fosters an unwilll,n,:SS to decentralize, 2) an apparent inability io 
reduce public sectol employment even with increased contracting out, 3) 
some limitations in bidding processes that curtail competition, and 4) 
central government inability to envision other opportunities fo~ the 
consid~ration of creative ways to use contracting out. 
o In direct administration, community contribution in the form of self 
help has been an i~portant element in construction activities. It is 
able to reduce the costs to government of some public works as much as 
50 Yo using this approach. To a certain extent, it also deals with the 
free-rider problem in providing public services to Hondurans who do not 
pay any tax or fee. 
a The qualities of construction by contracting out and by direct 
administration are approximately the same. The reason is that the 
publi~ sector r~tains res~onsibility, control, and final acceptance of 
qual i ty contro I. 
o Public sector employment levels in housing, education, and r03ds 
sectors are not affected by contracting out. There appear to be 
nei~her reductions in the number of employees nor are there indications 
that the numhers of public sector employees will decrease because of 
any transition to contracting out. Public sector employees continue to 
hold the same positions for the same kinds of activities as when direct 
administration was in force. What does appear to happen is a 
duplication of effort when there is contracting out. 
a Thera appear to be few, if any, effects of contracting out on changes 
of consumer crQices with the exception of one housing project. Private 
contractors as providers of construction services have little ability 
to affect decision-making. 
a Contracting out affects considerably community participation in 
construction projects. It has had the effect of limiting the potential 
for consumer participation by effectively blocking them from 
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participating as manual laborers in construction projects in their own 
communities. 
a Contracting out appears to have had the effect of reducing community 
involvement and participation in mafntenance activities because 
community members have less at stake'personally in the final product. 
More importantly, maintenance activities generally are affected 
negatively because there are no contractual requirements for the 
contractor to carry out maintenance activities once construction is 
complete. 
a In both approaches, it is the government that makes the decisions 
(with minimal input from the communities) about selecting construction 
siting. Private contractors are not able to influencp. location 
decisions since these decisions are made by the central government. 
C. Contracting Out Productivity 
a Start-up time from RFP to contract award takes approximately six 
months in most cases, but may take as long as one year. Construction 
time by private contractors is much faster than by public agencies 
because of less bureaucracy and paper work, fewer demands for acquiring 
minimal price quotes for purchasing materials, and more flexibility in 
management. 
o Public agency civil works are slower as they must get approval from 
the National Procurement Office (Proveeduria) for the purchase of 
supplies and equipment; this approval process can take up to six months 
for minimal orders. 
o The use of contracting out for specific construction projects may 
affect the integration of projects adversely. The impleme~ting public 
agency has better opportunities to provide liaison with other 
government agencies for coordination among projects. This coordination 
among projects and among public sector entities is much more difficult 
for private contractors. 
o The public sector is more successful in gaInIng community support for 
community-bas2d construction. Private contractors are often viewed by 
the community as simple providers of discrete and limited service on 
specific construction projects. 
D. Housing 3helter ~onstruction and Urban Upgrading 
a Institutional development within the National Housing Institute(INVA) 
has a record of continual changing relationships as it searches for the 
most efficient administrative operations. This lack of continuity in 
administrative procedures may have adversely affected progra~matic 
outcomes. 
a In urban upgrading, the Municipality of Tegucigalpa (CMDC) has used 
both direct administration and contracting out while the Municipality 
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of San Pedro Sula (MSPS) uses direct administration only. 
o There is no conclusive evidence that eitller direct administration or 
the contracting out approach is better because of the mixed data bases 
and the complexity of service delivery approaches. 
o Inefficient bidding and procurement procedures, and p~or monitoring 
of construction has affected construction timing and competition. 
Delay and lack of competition have significant cost implication~. 
E. Rural Primary School Construction 
o MOE and AID/Honduras both pref~r direct administration over 
contracting out because it (1) involves less direct cost to MOE, (2) 
allows greater community involvement in construction, and (3) increases 
possibilities of operation and maintenance of rural schools. 
o There is no evidence to support the thesis that contracting out has 
lowered pubiic sector employment within MOE. Rather, there is 
duplication of previous work with sontracting out. As a result, total 
costs uf the two systems are similar. . 
o Bidding is not competitive in contracted out projects. Pre-q'Jali~ied 
contracting firms were awarded contracts based un pre-determi~ed non-
competitive prices established by the Ministry uf Education and AID. It 
is difficult to assess how much lower construction costs could have 
been under competitive bidding circumstances. 
o Global school construction costs appear to have been lower under 
direct administration because of community contribution both in 
monetary and in-kind labor terms. These contributions mean savings to 
government of at least 50X. As a resuit, the comparative costs of 
contracting out seem high. However, when community involvement as an 
implicit project cost is included, the total costs of construction are 
similar to direct administration, because the community provides the 
othp.r 50 percent. 
o Advantages of contracting out are 1) expedie~cy in tim~, 2) less 
bureaucracy in supply of materials, and 3) somewhat higher quality of 
construction. Disadvantages are 1) less involvement with community, 2) 
higher direct costs for the Ministry budget> and 3) limited concern for 
the subsequent operation and maintenance of the school. 
o Advantages of direct administration by the MOE are 1) concerted 
effort by the Ministry in social promotion and follow-up, 2) less 
direct costs to government, and therefore the capacity for building 
more schools, 3) considerable improvements in operation and maintenance 
of schools over long run. Disadvantages include 1) considerable 
bureaucratic delays in school construction, 2) somewhat lower quality 
schools, and 3) larger number public sector employees needed for 
supervision and promotion. 
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F. Rural Road Construction 
o SECOPT uses three dii"ferent rural road construction models: 1) direct 
administration utilizing manual labor, 2) an AID-funded limited 
contracting out approactl, and 3) an 'lOB/World Bank-funded full 
contracting out approach. Each syste~ has advantages a~d disadvantages. 
Any of the thrp.~ systems can be used effectively as all three have 
well-organized delivery systems that function fairly smoothlv. 
o AID Proje~t Unit uses effective ~ontracting out system with 15-20 
constructiDn firms. Relationships with contractors appear to be good to 
excellent. Competitiveness is adequate. There is some possibility for 
collusion by contractors as bids are given in bloc~s and recently only 
one contractor has been awarded a contract per block. On the other 
hand, the block system is efficient in optimizing the use of equipment. 
o AID Project Unit designs, plan' ; supervision, quality control, 
follow-up, ~nd maintenance are a'l controlled. Private contractors 
simply provide equipment and machinery rented out to conduct works 
according to SECOPT orders. Some previous World Bank-funded projects 
were managed in the same fashion. 
o An alternative full contracting out dpproach has been used by SECOPT 
as well. The approach has compreh~nsive feasibility studies ca~ried out 
by contracting out with the participation of SECOPT in the socio-
economic analysis. Final engineering is done partially by contractin9 
out and partially by direct administration. Construction and 
supervision are normally contracted out. The road quality appears to be 
higher with this total system. 
o Cost analysis indicates that the construction costs per kilometer 
using direct adminj~tration approximately equals the method of limited 
contracting out. The design standar~ of the rural roads in both methods 
seems to be similar or equivalent. 
o Bidding unit prices are similar with practically no differences 
betwepn SECOPT/AID and SECOPT/tDB rural road projects. Bidding unit 
prices with limited contracting out ~nd full contracti~g out are 
practically the same. The full contracting out approach may be less 
expensive, therefore, because of tIle additional costs of 
administration, supervision, quality control, and additional government 
costs related to the limited contracting out approach. 
G. Recommendations 
o Consider the u~~ of ~ontraLting out for services as part of the 
policy dialogue at the highest levels of the Government of Honduras to 
promote a more favorable privatization environment and an interest in 
using the private sector for the production of goods, but also for the 
provision of services as well as maintenance activities. 
o Initiate concrete and specific means to streamline the governmental 
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procedures for acquisition of materials and supplies through the 
General Procurement Office (Proveeduria>. 
o Initiate means tu streamline the legal and bureaucratic procedures 
required for contractors to be award~d contracts. This should include 
alternative means for requiring bonds for contracted out constructiun 
activities. 
o Ma~imize to the fullest manual labor &nd labor intensive techniques 
through contracting out so as to make full use of international donor 
funds to generate employment and at the same time enhance the mechanism 
of contracting out. 
o Restructure public sector employment positions to avoid duplication 
of efforts when contracting out. 
o Monitor bidding procedures more carefully to assure against possible 
collusion. 
o Encourage the e~ploration of contracting out alternatives in the 
design of Project Papers. 
o Institute the use of performance standards rather than specification 
codes for construction project bidding to encourage innovations to 
reduce costs. 
For housing and urban upgrading: 
o Establish and monitor contracting out procedures that stipulate 
clearly res~onsibilities and obligations. 
o Encourage increased coordination among gov2rnment service del!very 
agencies and with private sector developers. Problem~ of weak 
coordination have had adverse effects on construction completion and 
integration. 
o Low cost bids in a cost-plus arrangement may not be the most 
efficient basis for co~tract awards. 
For primary school constrl~tion: 
o Efforts should be made to assure community in.Jlvement in manual 
labor. In particular, local residents can be used in more formalized 
maintenance and operation schemes. Incentives to contractors who 
utilize local labor in construction subsequent maintenance should De 
establist.ed. 
o There is a need for procedures to assure more competitive bidding in 
school construction projects 
~ There is a need to revise the internal reference cost system as the 
guideline for establishing costs. 
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For rural road construction: 
o Requirements in ~ids should include the use of local manual labor in 
construction crews as a means of reducing costs and generating local 
employment. 
o Establish Phase I construction and Phase II maintenance contrac~s in 
the same bi~. 
o There is a need for SECOPT to update and broaden guidelines and 
capabilitiE~ in the final design of projects so that contractors have 
uniform ~tandards for construction. 
H. Future Studies 
The evidence documented here demonstrates that privatization leads to a 
number of political and economic implications. Therefore, policy 
decisions to use private means to deliver publicly financed goods and 
services must be made in careful consideration of policy objectives at 
the national level. At present, however, we know little about the 
nature of the trade-offs between various national policy objectives 
created by alternative means Qf service delivery. At least three 
categories of additional warY. seem warranted. They ar~ as follows: 
o Conduct similar studies in ether sectol's and countries. The current 
study deals only with a limited number of cases in three sectors in 
Honduras. In order to be able to make more sound generalization about 
the factors affecting the effectiveness of privatization, we need to 
analyze additional cases in different settings. 
o Investigate the impact of privatization on political and economic 
objectives at the national level. Policy makers need to know how 
national policy objectives are affected by privatization of public 
services. Of particular importance is to examine the cOllflicts between 
political objectives which are often hidden and economic objectives 
which are publicly annou~ced. 
o Prepare implementation manuals for officials in developing countries. 
Many policy studies are not disseminated to public officials in readily 
usable form. Implementation manuals designed to give practical 
guidelines will greatly improve tIle process of policy dialogue and 
facilitate policy reform in developing countries. 
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